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Does a liberal state have a legitimate interest in defining the terms of intimate re-
lationships? Recently, several scholars have answered this question “no” and concluded 
that the state should abolish marriage, along with all other categories of intimate status. 
While politically infeasible, these proposals offer a powerful thought experiment. In this 
Article, I use this thought experiment to argue that the law cannot avoid relying on inti-
mate status norms and has legitimate reasons to retain an intimate status like marriage.  
The argument has three parts. The primary lesson of the thought-experiment is 
that the state cannot abolish intimate status. Even if a state abolished formal status regis-
tries, private law would recreate ad hoc status distinctions. As long as intimates can 
bring claims against one another in contract, tort, or equity, ordinary private law doc-
trines will require judges or juries to interpret the parties’ legal rights in light of the na-
ture of their relationship. The state might exempt intimates from these ordinary legal doc-
trines, but that would place a systemic status distinction at the heart of private law.  
Second, the reason private law cannot avoid intimate status is that many intimate 
norms are what moral philosophers call “imperfect duties.” A duty is imperfect when the 
actor has discretion to decide how and when to fulfill it. Whether a discretionary act ful-
fills an imperfect duty depends on whether it expresses the actor’s subjective commitment 
to the values and ends of the relationship. Consequently, the only way for a third party to 
make precise judgments about imperfect duties is to interpret the parties’ conduct in light 
of normative standards for that type of relationship. The law can enforce imperfect inti-
mate duties only if it supplants the couple’s discretion to interpret their duties and re-
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places their commitment with legal sanctions. 
Finally, marital status offers a way to manage the tension created by imperfect in-
timate rights. The law refuses to enforce marital rights in ongoing relationships, which 
prevents the state from displacing couples’ discretion and commitment. After the couples 
separates, they abandon their commitment and lose their discretionary authority, so the 
state may use equitable and egalitarian norms to protect the former spouses’ legitimate 
expectations. This combination of deferred protection and equitable remedies offers a 
framework for legally protected imperfect rights.  
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The same-sex marriage controversy has kept marriage at the forefront of our national con-
sciousness. Yet, we have made little headway on the most fundamental question for marriage 
law: why regulate marriage at all? Courts have demanded that opponents of same-sex marriage 
articulate a purpose for legal marriage, one that does not apply to same-sex couples and does not 
bottom-out in opposition to homosexuality, whether based in theology, morality or prejudice.
1
 In 
contrast, same-sex marriage advocates have needed to argue only that same-sex relationships 
serve similar functions as opposite-sex relationships. This asymmetric burden is partly a doctri-
nal construct. Laws banning gay marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause if the state cannot 
identify relevant differences between same and opposite-sex couples. More fundamentally, how-
ever, this asymmetry rests on an implicit baseline assumption that the state has some legitimate 
reason to regulate intimacy.
2
 What is it? What legitimate reason do liberal states have to dictate 
the terms of intimate relationships?
 3
  
One promising way to start is to consider the opposite scenario. What if a state abolished le-
gal marriage? In fact, a number of prominent theorists from across the political spectrum – from 
Judith Butler and Martha Fineman to Cass Sunstein and David Boaz – have suggested the state 
 
 
1
 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. --, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (citing as exam-
ples of inappropriate justifications “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that 
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality”); Goodridge v. 
Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961-68 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217-18 (N.J. 
2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 982-84 (Wash. 2006); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 
897-906 (Iowa 2009). When a state has civil unions with equal legal rights, the question is whether there 
is a legitimate interest in restricting the expressive and social benefits of the title “marriage”. In re Mar-
riage Cases, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 738-40 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
479-481 (Conn. 2008). 
2
 I use “intimate” to refer to any adult relationship that is personal, long-term, and wide-ranging, 
which includes but is not limited to sexual relationships.  
3
 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, artfully dodged this question. 
The Court concluded that the Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of “marriage” as “a legal union be-
tween one man and one woman,” 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2013), violated “due process and equal protection princi-
ples,” id. at 2693, because that act had “the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure” a class of same-
sex couples “whom [New York], by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” Id. at 
2696. By focusing on animus, the Court avoided the harder question of why New York or the federal 
government are in the business of dignifying intimate relationships. The reprieve is momentary. When a 
state law ban on same-sex marriage comes before the Court, it will have to decide whether the sex of the 
couple is related to whatever legitimate public interests state marriage law serves.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
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should “abolish marriage” as a legal category.4 They do not merely want to replace the title 
“marriage” with a less controversial name like “civil unions.” They want the state to stop licens-
ing relationships. Individuals could adopt whatever social, religious or moral relationships they 
prefer, but the terms of their relationships would be legally enforceable only in tort, contract or 
equity. These proposals to abolish marriage rest on several shared arguments: the state has no 
legitimate reason to define the terms of intimate relationships, marriage law is an ineffective 
means to protect children and caregivers, and favoring marriages discriminates against cohabit-
ants and single people.  
The proposal to abolish legal marriage is politically infeasible, at least in the United States. 
Nevertheless, the idea is instructive. It offers a unique way to investigate the state’s interest in 
regulating intimacy. In this article, I try to reimagine our legal world without pre-defined catego-
ries of legal status. I draw three conclusions from this exercise. First, the state cannot avoid sta-
tus-based norms, even if it abolished licensed status categories. Second, the law cannot avoid 
status because intimate relationships involve imperfect duties. Finally, marital status provides a 
reasonable scheme of legal protection for imperfect rights in intimate relationships.  
This immediate lesson of trying to imagine a world without marriage is that the state cannot 
abolish intimacy status. Proponents of abolishing marriage assume that intimates will have en-
forceable rights in private law. However, private law doctrines often tailor our rights to the na-
ture of our relationships. Core principles of contract, tort or equity require the state to determine 
the parties’ relationship and impose judgments about appropriate duties for that category of rela-
tionships. Intimate relationships are one among many relationships that alter our private law 
rights. The state could exempt intimates from these doctrines (or private law generally), but that 
exemption would also be a systemic status-based distinction. In short, abolishing legal marriage 
does not get the state out of the marriage business. 
Second, the reason why the state cannot avoid status categories is that many intimate norms 
are what moral philosophers call “imperfect duties.” 5 When intimate rights are enforced in pri-
vate law, public officials often vacillate between discerning the terms of parties’ relationship and 
imposing normative judgments on couples. This tension is inevitable because many intimate du-
ties are imperfect. A duty is imperfect when there are many permissible ways or occasions to ful-
fill it, leaving agents discretion to choose how and when to act. This discretion is limited by a 
requirement that the agent remain subjectively committed to fulfilling the duty. Legal judgments, 
 
 
4
 See infra notes 116-120.  
5
 Despite the nomenclature, imperfect duties are not deficient. An imperfect duty can be more 
important and stringent than a perfect duty which admits only one manner of performance.  
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however, require determinate rights. Judges or juries must specify the precise content of a cou-
ple’s duties, but they cannot simply discern and enforce imperfect duties. These duties are inde-
terminate until settled by discretionary choices. The law can enforce imperfect intimate duties 
only if it displaces spouses’ discretion and commitment. 
Legal marriage – or some similar legal status – offers one way to manage this tension. Under 
current marriage law, spouses cannot sue one another to enforce marital rights during the rela-
tionship. I call this the “intact marriage rule.” A core feature of my argument for marital status, 
and a central contribution of this Article, is a limited defense of the intact marriage rule. By 
withholding enforcement during marriage, the law avoids supplanting spouses’ discretion and 
commitment. The intact marriage rule enables spouses to maintain a legal relationship of widely 
discretionary duties, limited primarily by their subjective commitment. Yet, marital status does 
not abandon protection of spouses’ imperfect rights; it simply defers it. If spouses separate, they 
abandon their commitment and ongoing discretion, so the state can worry less about interfering 
with their liberty to define their relationship and their ability to express their commitment. Hav-
ing deferred protection during marriage, what dissolution norms should the state use? This Arti-
cle does not suggest a precise divorce regime, but it sketches certain contours. The law withholds 
enforcement so spouses can define their relationship with indeterminate duties, so it would be 
inappropriate to try to discern precise terms to enforce at divorce. Instead, the state may assume 
intimates entered and sustained their relationship because they believed it mutually beneficial, 
which makes egalitarian default rules appropriate. This conclusion is broadly consistent with 
modern divorce law, which gives judges wide discretion to divide property equitably, tempered 
by egalitarian default rules. In short, by combining deferred protection with equitable dissolution 
norms, marital status creates a framework of imperfect legal rights, something many political 
philosophers have thought was impossible.
6
 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Section I explains the current regulation of intimate rela-
tionships and describes the proposals for abolishing marriage. Section II argues that even if the 
state abolishes marriage, core doctrines in tort, contract and equity would still require status 
based norms. Section III argues that the state inevitably relies on status norms because intimate 
relationships are characterized by imperfect duties and describes the difficulties this poses for 
legal enforcement. Section IV offers a limited defense of legal marriage, arguing that its combi-
nation of deferred protection and equitable dissolution is a reasonable way to create imperfect 
 
 
6
 John Stuart Mill, UTILITARIANISM 61 (Batoche Books ed. 2001) (1861); Immanuel Kant, THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AK 6:384-88 (1797), reprinted in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
517-520 (Mary Gregor trans. and ed., Cambridge University Press 1996). 
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legal duties. Section V considers two objections to deferring intimate rights during the marriage.  
At the outset, I should make several limits of the Article clear. First, I do not engage directly 
in the same-sex marriage debate. The rationale that I articulate for marital status does not differ-
entiate between same and opposite-sex couples. However, it is only one reason for marital status. 
Other reasons for regulating intimacy might apply differently to same-sex relationships. Second, 
this Article does not offer a full defense of marriage. This Article focuses on the regulation of 
rights between intimates. Marriage law does much more. It structures the couples’ relationship to 
third parties, creating default rights such as the power to make medical decisions.
7
 It also affects 
spouses’ entitlements to material benefits, such as family leave or social security. The state also 
extols marriage and uses marriage’s social value to discriminate. These aspects of marriage law 
raise fundamental questions of justice, but I do not address them here. If the state has no legiti-
mate reason to regulate intimate relationships, then this problem is distinct from the expressive 
or distributional effect of intimate regulations. Last, this Article does not address the relationship 
between marriage and children. A full account of relationship law must address the interaction of 
caregiver and relationship status. Nevertheless, the two may be considered separately.
8
 Many 
intimate partners have no children, and many children are not raised by intimate partners. This 
article addresses only whether the state has a direct interest in maintaining status-based regula-
tions of adult intimate relationships. 
Before trying to envision a world without status categories, it is important to see the breadth 
of existing relationship regulations. Current law regulates relationships, both licensed and unli-
censed ones. This section offers a birds-eye view of both, before moving on to describe pro-
posals to abolish these intimate status rules.  
A. Licensed Relationships 
The range of relationship licenses has ballooned in the last twenty years, and the pace of 
change is rapid.
9
 Marriage remains the paradigmatic status and the only status recognized in all 
American states, but many states now offer alternatives, including civil unions, reciprocal bene-
 
 
7
 See Mary Ann Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1783-84 (2004-2005). 
8
 See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-
Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197 (2012).  
9
 William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default 
Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1883-86 (2012). 
II. CURRENT LAW OF RELATIONSHIP REGULATION  
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ficiaries and domestic partnerships. This subsection describes the current regime of licensed rela-
tionships in the United States.
10
 At the outset, it is important to note that these statuses are exclu-
sive. A couple can maintain only one status, and a person can maintain a status relationship with 
only one person at a time.
11
 
1. Marriage 
Despite its much-heralded decline, marriage retains vast popular appeal. A 2001 study pre-
dicted that almost 90% of American women will marry in their lifetime.
12
 Between 40 and 50% 
of American marriages end in divorce, but this implies that 50 to 60% last until death.
13
 This sec-
tion recounts the default rules governing marital relationships. Marriage law has legal phases. 
The state (1) polices entry into marriage; (2) provides benefits during marriage, but refuses to 
enforce marital rights; and (3) imposes equitable dissolution norms when the marriage ends. In 
later sections, I will argue that there are legitimate reasons to retain a status with this general 
structure. 
a. Entering Marriage 
In most states, to be legally married, a couple must obtain a license and exchange vows be-
fore a licensed officiate. The state uses registration to ensure that fiancés are competent to accept 
marital obligations (of sufficient age, able to consent), to impose limits on who may marry (two 
persons who are unmarried, not close relatives and, in most jurisdictions, of the opposite sex), 
and to keep track of who is entitled to marriage’s benefits and burdens. Eleven states and the 
 
 
10
 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren R. Spedale, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR 
WORSE? WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 252-55 (2006), for an alternative categorization.  
11
 E.g. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-104 (exclusivity), 15-22-111(3) (automatic termination) 
(2013); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572B-2 (exclusivity), 572-1.7 (automatic termination). Exceptions exist 
when a state with new laws wants to avoid disrupting settled expectations. E.g. Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, State of N.J. Dept. of Health, http://www.nj.gov/health/vital/faq.shtml#ssm (last accessed Feb. 9, 
2013) (same-sex couples in civil unions or domestic partnerships may marry and retain their prior status). 
12
 Goldstein, J. R., & Kenney, C. T., Marriage delayed or marriage forgone? New cohort fore-
casts of first marriage for U.S. women, AM. SOC. REV., Aug. 2001, at 506, 507.  
13
 Andrew Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of Research in the 2000s, 
72 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 405 (Jun. 2010). These numbers hide increasing differences in marriage rates 
across racial, income and educational divides, with non-Hispanic white and college-educated women be-
ing more likely to marry and less likely to divorce. See id. at 404-05. See generally Sara McLanahan, Di-
verging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRA-
PHY 607 (2004); Linda McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L. REV. 921 (2013). 
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District of Columbia still recognize common law marriages.
14
 A common law marriage exists if 
the spouses have the capacity to marry, have a present and mutual intent to marry, cohabitate for 
a significant amount of time and hold themselves out to the community as married.
15
 Common 
law spouses have the same rights and obligations as registered spouses.
16
  
Most couples simply obtain a license and exchanges vows. This means the terms of their 
marriage are set by default rules in marriage statutes, which I discuss below. However, a small 
minority of spouses enter premarital contracts to define their marital obligations. Most of mar-
riages’ rules are now soft default rules that parties may alter contractually. Premarital agreements 
about property and support are enforceable, subject to mandatory rules and fairness limits.
17
 The 
parties cannot, however, alter the grounds for divorce or eliminate a spouses’ elective share.18 In 
addition, many states offer procedural protections such requiring fiancés to make ex ante disclo-
sures or substantive protections through hardship or unconscionability review.
19
 Unlike agree-
ments made before marriage, “marital agreements” between spouses in an intact marriage are 
viewed with suspicion.
20
 A few states enforce marital agreements without restriction, but others 
view them as presumptively invalid or subject them to strict fairness review. 
b. During Marriage 
During marriage, the state engages in a curious blend of intervention and non-intervention. 
On the one hand, married couples receive numerous legal benefits. The benefits can be catego-
 
 
14
 See Jennifer Thomas, Common Law Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 151, 151 
(2009) (listing current authorities). Inertia likely kept common law marriage on the books, but Cynthia 
Bowman has argued that it should be more actively used to protect women who adopt vulnerable tradi-
tional roles. A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 720 (1996). 
15
 Thomas, supra note 14, at 157-160. 
16
 Id. Common law spouses occupy a space between licensed marriages and cohabitation. Unlike 
cohabitants, they must intend and hold themselves out as married. However, the state plays no role at en-
try and less of a role during marriage, because spouses typically seek legal recognition only in divorce 
petitions, in probate after one spouse’s death, or if one spouse wants to assert an evidentiary privilege.  
17
 Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital Agree-
ments, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 318-324 (2012) (describing modern case law regarding enforcement of pre-
marital agreements). 
18
 The elective share protects surviving spouses from disinheritance by giving them right to 
choose between their rights under their spouse’s will or one-third of their spouse’s estate. 
19
 Atwood & Bix, supra note 17, at 332-33, 339-44 (discussing procedural and substantive fair-
ness standards considered and adopted by the UPMAA). 
20
 Id. at 324-28 (describing “unsettled and evolving” law regarding marital agreements).  
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rized in various ways, but I find the “rough taxonomy” offered by Elizabeth Brake useful.21 First, 
the state conditions monetary benefits (and some burdens) on marital status. For instance, mar-
ried couples receive special tax status and social security benefits. Other laws “facilitate day-to-
day maintenance of a relationship,” such as sick leave, emergency decision-making powers or 
immigration benefits. This category also includes the default rules for assigning title and control 
over property during marriage.
22
 Last, the law provides special protection for the widowed, in-
cluding pension benefits, precedence in intestacy and the right to bring wrongful death claims. 
All of these benefits, of course, affect spouses’ incentives for marital behavior. For instance, fed-
eral tax law reinforces the breadwinner marriage by rewarding couples with unequal salaries. In 
addition, as Kerry Abrams has documented, the law sometimes expressly requires intimates to 
structure their lives in particular ways.
23
 Immigration authorities, for instance, have adopted in-
trusive tests to decide whether a formally valid marriage is “fraudulent,” which in practice re-
quire couples to prove they fulfill stereotypical marital roles.
24
  
On the other hand, American law takes a hands-off approach to the spouses’ duties with re-
spect to one another. Spouses cannot enforce marital rights during their marriage. This limit ap-
plies to marital rights arising from status or agreements. Spouses may sue one another in tort and 
can be subject to criminal liability,
25
 but they cannot sue to enforce “marital rights.” The classic 
cases concern the duty of spousal support. These courts held that a spouse could not bring an ac-
 
 
21
 Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law, 
ETHICS Vol. 120.2 (2010), at 306-307. For an alternative list, see Cass Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2084, 2090-92 (2004).  
22
 Forty-two states follow the “title scheme,” in which each spouse owns any property to which he 
or she holds title. J. Thomas Oldham, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 3 
(2005). In eight “community property” states, each spouse holds a one-half interest in all property, except 
property owned prior to the marriage, gifts or inheritances to one spouse, or profits from such property. 
Id. at §3.03.  
23
 Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14-38 (2012).  
24
 Id. at 30-37. 
25
 Until recently, the spousal unity fiction precluded spouses from suing one another in tort at all. 
Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 364-66 (1988). These doctrines 
have been abolished or abrogated to specific causes of action in all but a minority of states. Id. at 359, 
435-41. All states have eliminated the marital rape exemption, Jennifer McMahon-Howard, Criminalizing 
Spousal Rape: The Diffusion of Legal Reform, 52 SOC. PERSP. 505, 513 tbl.1 (2009), although a majority 
still “criminalize a narrower range of [sexual] offenses if committed within marriage, subject the marital 
rape they do recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create special procedural hurdles for marital rape 
prosecutions.” Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1373, 1375, 1484-85 (2000) (citations omitted).  
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tion for financial support until the couple separates.
26
 Some jurisdictions permit spouses to seek 
support if necessary to avoid “neglect.”27 In addition, courts will not enforce agreements about 
behavior during the marriage, such as agreements about sexual expectations, familial living ar-
rangements, domestic services or religious practices.
28
 This rule applies during marriage and at 
divorce. The most striking limit is this respect is that some states will not enforce contracts be-
tween spouses for domestic services.
29
 The traditional rationale for this rule is that spouses al-
ready have a mutual obligation of support, so a promise of support is insufficient consideration.
30
 
Other states, however, permit spouses to recover for services if they have an express contract.
31
 
As a rule, however, spouses cannot enforce marital rights while their marriage is intact. I will 
 
 
26
 McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226 (1953); Smith v. Smith, 92 N.E.2d 418, 418-19 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1949); Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 123 (1948). One unpublished California case con-
cluded marital support obligations are enforceable during marriage even if the spouse is not destitute, but 
on special facts: the plaintiff sued her legally incompetent husband through her stepson, who was acting 
trustee of her husband’s estate. Weissberg v. Weissberg, A132161, 2013 WL 1276119 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2013).  
27
 See Com. ex rel. DiPadova v. DiPadova, 223 Pa. Super. 408, 410 (1973). 
28
 See Mary Ann Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & Pol’y 
225, 227 (2011); Jonathan E. Fields, Forbidden Provisions in Prenuptial Agreements: Legal and Practi-
cal Considerations for the Matrimonial Lawyer, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 413, 429 (2008); Reva 
B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 
82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2197 n.248 (1994) (collecting cases); Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform Pre-
marital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulat-
ing the Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1046 (1993) (collecting cases). The Uniform 
Law Commission’s Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, passed in 1983 and adopted by 26 states, states 
that couples may contract about “any . . . matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in 
violation of public policy.” § 3(a)(8). Nevertheless, I have found no cases supporting the implications of § 
3 that (1) premarital or marital agreements are enforceable during marriage or (2) premarital or marital 
agreements regarding ordinary life are enforceable. In the 2012 revision of the Uniform Premarital and 
Marital Agreement Act, the drafters chose not to “expressly deal” with provisions regarding “obligations 
inter se”. Atwood & Bix, supra note 17 at 344. 
29
 Mays v. Wadel, 236 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind. App. 1968) (refusing to enforce husband’s promise 
to pay for death-bed nursing services); In re Estate of Lord, 602 P.2d 1030, 103I (N.M. 1979) (refusing to 
enforce wife’s promise to devise her estate to husband if he married and cared for her during her illness); 
Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 357 (1993) (refusing to enforce husband’s promise to support all 
of the family’s financial needs once he completing his master’s and law degrees if wife would forego her 
career to work as a teacher during his schooling). 
30
 See, e.g. Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 650-54 (1st Dist.1993) (refusing to enforce 
husband’s promise to bequeath wife a portion of his separate property if she cared for him in their home 
rather than sending him to nursing home). This argument has been justly criticized, see e.g. Katharine 
Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1996). 
31
 Dade v. Anderson, 439 S.E.2d 353, 356 (Va. 1994). 
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call this the “intact marriage rule.”32 
c. Separation and Divorce 
Separation marks a categorical divide. After the couple separates, a spouse may bring an ac-
tion for “maintenance.” Separation lacks a precise legal definition, but it is roughly synonymous 
with ending the relationship or breaking up.
33
 Spouses may be separated yet living in the same 
house, as long as they do not share personal or social activities.
34
  
All American jurisdictions have no-fault divorce statutes, which allow spouses to divorce if 
their marriage is irretrievably broken because of “irreconcilable differences.”35 Spouses may be 
required to wait for a statutory period from six months to two years, which is lengthened if one 
spouse refuses consent.
36
 Most courts do not question one spouse’s claim that the couple has “ir-
reconcilable differences”.37 Some states also retain “fault” grounds for divorce, including adul-
tery, desertion, mental or physical cruelty, drunkenness and non-support, although the primary 
difference is to shorten the waiting period.
38
  
All of the states use loosely egalitarian default rules to divide marital property and to give 
 
 
32
 Saul Levmore calls it a “love-it or leave-it rule,” but I think this places undue emphasis on the 
remedy. Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of Remedies 
in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 226 (1995). 
33
 Historically, separation had a much more contested and varied meaning, because spouses often 
lacked the legal right or financial means to obtain a divorce and “separated” wives in particular suffered 
under coverture doctrines that granted them rights only through their husbands. Henrik Hartog, MAN AND 
WIFE IN AMERICA 38-39 (2000) (summarizing historical rights of separated spouses).  
34
See, e.g. Mackey v. Mackey, 376 Pa. Super. 146, 153 (1988) (spouses were separated though re-
siding in the same home and sharing public areas, because they maintained private living quarters, no 
longer maintain “'public social life'” and “'[s]ignificantly, the parties stipulate that they have not engaged 
in sexual relations'” in three years). 
35
 For a history of divorce reform, see generally Herman Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the 
Joint Venture, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2017 (2000); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conun-
drum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 82-90. 
36
 See generally 62 A.L.R.2d 1262-65 (1994) (describing state statutes requiring waiting period). 
37
 Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
20
TH
 CENTURY AMERICA, 176-80 (2011). 
38
 Id. at 161-68. Although these are often listed as the “traditional” fault grounds, divorce was 
largely unavailable until the mid-eighteenth century and adultery was the only ground for divorce until 
the early twentieth century. Hartog, supra note 33, at 26-28, 64-73.  
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dependent spouses limited support.
39
 A vast majority divide all property obtained during the mar-
riage “equitably.”40 Family court judges must decide what division is fair, based on numerous 
factors that attempt to value each spouses’ relative need and their contribution to the marriage 
and to marital property.
41
 Equitable divorce does not balance a couple’s relationship ledger. 
Courts consider each spouse’s contribution, but primarily to offset financial imbalances rather 
than compensate spouses for their contributions.
42
 Some equitable distribution states also have a 
presumption that marital property will be divided equally or that equal division will be the “start-
ing point” for analysis.43 Empirical analysis of divorce outcomes suggests that judges applying 
equitable distribution rules tend to converge on equal division as a general norm.
44
  
Divorce courts also have the power to award alimony, though alimony awards are rare.
45
 Al-
imony is no longer regarded as compensation for a promise of life-long support, but no dominant 
 
 
39
 Many argue that divorce norms are insufficiently egalitarian. See generally Martha Albertson 
Fineman, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1994) (argu-
ing divorce rhetoric supports formal over equality of outcomes). 
40
 Three community property states divide all marital property equally and leave separate property 
with the title-holder, and a few common law states divide all of the couples property equitably regardless 
of its characterization as marital or separate. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.09 cmt. a (2002). 
41
 Id.  
42
 See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982) ("'Marriage is not a business ar-
rangement in which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon di-
vorce.'"). 
43
 Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 105 
(2004) (identifying ten states with a presumption, four with a starting point, and three additional that re-
quire equal division). The A.L.I. adopted a presumption of equal division. A.L.I PRINCIPLES, supra note 
40, § 4.09. 
44
 Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discre-
tionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 452, 507 (1996) (study of judicial decisions and settle-
ment outcomes in New York from 1980-1990).  
45
 Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribu-
tion Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 697 (1991) (alimony awarded in 9% of New 
York cases in 1984); Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical 
Study of Divorce Cases, 12 J. L. FAM. STUD. 57, 75 (2010) (alimony awarded in 8% of divorces in one 
county in Wisconsin). In 2012, only 385,000 Americans receive alimony, yet, in 2011, over 2.3 million 
Americans divorced and 248 million total were divorced. U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Person Income Table 
of Contents, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032013/perinc/pinc08_000.htm; Divorces in the 
Last Year by Sex by Marital Status for the Population 15 Years and Over, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/12_5YR/B12503.  
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alternative theory has emerged.
46
 Many states follow a “rehabilitative approach” that awards on-
ly temporary alimony to help dependent spouses regain financial self-sufficiency.
47
 Some states, 
however, use alimony to help spouses retain their marital standard of living. States may regard 
alimony as compensation for one spouses’ foregone career opportunities, as a fair return on her 
contribution to the marriage, or as restitution for contributions to the spouses’ future earning po-
tential.
 48
 Unlike property divisions that vest upon entry of judgment, alimony rights may be ad-
justed if the parties’ financial positions change, such as if the payer loses a job or the payee re-
marries.
49
 As a result, many argue that property division is a legal entitlement while alimony is a 
form of privatized welfare.
50
 
The states are split about whether marital misbehavior is relevant to property division or ali-
mony. Sixteen states do not consider marital misconduct (such as adultery or emotional abuse) 
arguing that adjudicating these disputes intrudes on marital privacy and wastes judicial resources 
on matters irrelevant to disentangling the spouses’ lives. 51 On the other hand, thirteen states 
permit courts to adjust the property division if one spouses’ behavior burdened the marriage or 
contributed to its breakup.
52
 The property division may reflect “spousal abuse; child abuse; adul-
tery; desertion; cruelty; nonsupport; failure to cooperate during a divorce, attempted murder,” or 
 
 
46
 Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271 (2011) (surveying theories of alimony 
and models for reform); Carol Rogerson, The Canadian Law of Spousal Support, 38 FAM. L.Q. 69, 73-95 
(2004-2005).  
47
 Mary Frances Lyle & Jeffrey L. Levy, From Riches to Rags: Does Rehabilitative Alimony Need 
to be Rehabilitated? 38 FAM. L.Q. 3, 13 (2005). This approach was adopted in the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act § 308, which influenced alimony reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. Lyle & Levy, 8-10. A 
handful of states award alimony only if a spouse cannot meet her basic needs through employment or if 
the spouse has a physically or mental disability. Id., at 15.  
48
 Starnes, supra note 46, at 280-87. It is controversial whether future earning capacity should be 
a factor in determining an alimony award, an asset subject to equitable division, a factor in the equitable 
division or should not be considered at all. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 43, at 107-11; William Howard, 
Spouse's Professional Degree or License as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Prop-
erty Settlement, 3 A.L.R. 6th 447, § 3 (2005). 
49
 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 43, at 105.  
50
 Id. 
51
 Brett R. Turner, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY ASSETS 3D, § 8:24 (2005); Kristine 
Cordier Karnezis, Fault as consideration in alimony, spousal support, or property division awards pursu-
ant to no-fault divorce, 86 A.L.R.3d 1116, §§ 3(b), 4 (originally published in 1978). 
52
 Turner, supra note 51, § 8:24 (Texas, Alabama, Connecticut, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
Missouri, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); Oldham, supra 
note 25, § 13.02[1][a] (citing, in addition, Idaho and New Hampshire); Karnezis, supra note 51, §§ 3(a), 
5-6.  
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substance abuse.
53
 Three more states consider only egregious conduct, which would include re-
peated physical abuse, attempted murder, child abuse or refusal to grant a religious divorce, but 
not adultery, cruelty or isolated assaults.
54
  
2. Civil Unions and strong domestic partnerships 
Ten states maintain a status with rights that are equivalent to marriage but under a different 
name – either civil unions or domestic partnerships. For simplicity, I will call these laws “civil 
unions.” Civil unions carry the same rights, obligations, benefits and burdens of marriage, in-
cluding access to public benefits and the divorce regime.
55
 Some states impose additional criteria 
on applicants to prove their interdependence, such as sharing a “common residence.”56  
It is unclear whether civil unions represent a true alternative to marriage or are simply a tran-
sitional stage to equality for same-sex couples.
57
 Four states limit civil unions to opposite cou-
ples,
58
 and two more limit them to same-sex couples or opposite sex couples over the age of 62.
59
 
Only four jurisdictions permit same and opposite-sex couples to enter civil unions.
60
 Several 
 
 
53
 Turner, supra note 51, § 8.26 (New York, Kansas, North Dakota). 
54
 Id. § 8:25. 
55
 Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont recognize civil unions. 
DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 201–17 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572B (2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1–/90 
(2010); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 37:1-28 to -36 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-3.1 (2011); VT. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 
1201–07 (2012). California, the District of Columbia, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington recognize do-
mestic partnerships. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297-99; D.C. CODE §§ 32-701 to -710 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§§ 122A (2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300-40 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60 (2013). 
56
 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.60.030(1); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.100. 
57
 See e.g. Barbara Cox, But Why Not Marriage: Some Thoughts on Vermont’s Civil Unions Law, 
Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VERMONT L. REV. 113, 147 (2000); contra William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 121 (2002) (de-
scribing new forms of relationships in Europe as “sedimentary” because the new form is placed on top of 
the old, rather than replacing it). As of July 2014, same sex couples may marry in nineteen states and the 
District of Columbia, and twelve states have pending rulings in favor of gay marriage. Freedom to Marry, 
Inc., States, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (offering updated information on the recognition of 
same-sex unions). 
58
 DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 202(3); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 37:1-29; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.310; R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-1;  
59
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(4); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60.030(5). 
60
 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572B-2; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/10; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.100; 
D.C. CODE §§ 32-701. Effective June 30, 2014, Washington opened domestic partnerships to opposite sex 
couples. RCWA 26.60.030 (West 2014). 
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states eliminated civil unions when they started recognizing same-sex marriages,
61
 while others 
retained a civil union registry.
62
 Why would a couple prefer a civil union if marriage is availa-
ble? Civil unions appeal to those who want to avoid marriage’s connotations: its religious impli-
cations; its historical association with oppression of women and racial and sexual minorities; or 
its social signaling effects that can channel couples into traditional marital roles.  
3. Registered beneficiaries and intermediate domestic partnerships 
Five states have “reciprocal beneficiary” or limited “domestic partnership” laws.63 Recipro-
cal beneficiaries do not receive property or support rights, but do receive a set of reciprocal 
rights useful for people in intimate relationships.
64
 They may receive inheritance rights, surrogate 
decision-making rights, hospital visitation rights, the right to sue for wrongful death, employ-
ment benefits or the right to hold property as tenants by the entirety.
65
  
Reciprocal beneficiary status is easier to enter and exit than marriage, but the substantive 
limits on entry can be more onerous. To create a relationship, individuals need only fill out a 
form alleging that they are not in another recognized relationship and agreeing to assume the 
listed rights.
66
 Colorado even supplies a model form that requires each parties to initial the spe-
 
 
61
Office of the Secretary of State, Washington, Notice regarding same sex marriage and domestic 
partnerships, http://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/domesticpartnerships/Notice-regarding-same-sex-marriage-
and-domestic-partnerships.aspx (last accessed Dec. 16, 2013) (opposite-sex couples over 62 at the end of 
the effective date may retain their domestic partnership); Kimberly Blanton, Unmarried Gay Couples 
Lose Health Benefits, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1. 
62
 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1.7 (2012) (specifying relation of marriage, civil unions and recipro-
cal beneficiaries); Office of the Governor of the State of Hawaii, Marriage in Hawaii – FAQ, 
http://governor.hawaii.gov/blog/marriage-in-hawaii/; State of N.J. Dept. of Health, Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.nj.gov/health/vital/faq.shtml#ssm.  
63
 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-106; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (2011) (limited to individuals 
prohibited from marrying, which now applies only to family members covered by the incest prohibition); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2710; MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 770 (2011).  
64
 Eskridge calls these “unitive rules,” which are rules that “enforce or reflect the assumption that 
a married couple operate as a unit or a team, whose interdependence should be respected by the govern-
ment.” Eskridge, supra note 10, at 1910.  
65
 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-106; ME. PL 2003, c. 672, 
2004 ME. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 672 (H.P. 1152) (L.D. 1579) (altering various code provisions to give domes-
tic partners rights equivalent to spouses for inheritance, guardianship and protection from domestic 
abuse). Wisconsin does not give domestic partners employment benefits. WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001 et seq. 
Notably, for the first three rights, parties have the power to designate the rights-holder, but for the last 
three rights, the law continues to specify the categories of possible rights-holders. 
66
 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2710(3). 
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cific rights they intend to adopt or withhold.
67
 Exiting the relationship is even easier. Either party 
may terminate the relationship unilaterally by filing a notice, which is effective immediately.
68
 
The beneficiary status can also terminate automatically if one of the beneficiaries enters another 
marriage or civil union.
69
 Despite the ease of entry and exit, some states restrict reciprocal bene-
ficiary status to long-term cohabitants who are committed to mutual support.
70
 Maryland even 
requires applicants to present two documents proving their interdependence, such as a mortgage, 
relationship contract, joint account, power of attorney, insurance policy or will.
71
  
4. Limited domestic partnerships registries 
Numerous cities and counties in twenty-five states maintain “domestic partnership regis-
tries.”72 LGBT advocates convinced municipalities to enact the first registries in the 1980s when 
state-level recognition was politically infeasible. Many cities also permit opposite sex couples to 
register as domestic partners. Domestic partnership registries cannot give the parties’ property or 
support rights, which are governed by state law. They do give partners hospital visitation rights 
and, for employees of the municipality or its contractors, employment benefits. Domestic part-
ners may also receive surrogate decision-making rights.
73
 
B. Unlicensed Cohabitating Relationships 
Even couples who do not enter licensed relationships may have enforceable obligations. De-
spite the increasing prevalence of cohabitation -- eight million couples lived together without 
 
 
67
 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-104, 15-22-106 (2011) (model contract)  
68
 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-7(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-22-104, 15-22-111(3); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 2710(4) (also requires service in hand to the other partner). 
69
 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-7(c).  
70
 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2710(2) (applicants must be “domiciled together under long-term ar-
rangements that evidence a commitment to remain responsible indefinitely for each other's welfare”); MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101 (applicants must “[a]gree to be in a relationship of mutual interde-
pendence in which each individual contributes to the maintenance and support of the other individual and 
the relationship, even if both individuals are not required to contribute equally to the relationship”) 
71
 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101. 
72
 The Human Rights Campaign maintains an updated list of domestic partner registries. City and 
County Domestic Partner Registries, Hum. Rts. Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/city-and-
county-domestic-partner-registries. 
73
 For example, New York recognizes “domestic partners” for surrogate decision-making, NY 
GEN MUN § 2965, hospital visitation, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-q, workers compensation and 
death benefits, N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 4; for death in terrorist attack, NY EST POW & TRST § 11-
4.7, and for conflict of interest analysis. NY GEN MUN § 811. 
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marrying in 2013, up from less than five million in 2000 and half a million in 1960
74
 -- the states 
have not developed a consistent regulatory scheme. Drawing on work by Ann Estin and Marsha 
Garrison, this section surveys the spectrum of legal regimes regulating cohabitating couples.
75
 
On one end, Illinois and Georgia deny cohabitants any legal remedies, even refusing to enforce 
written relationship contracts.
76
 On the other end, seven states impose property sharing or sup-
port obligations to cohabitants. The remaining 41 states in between regulate cohabitation using 
private law remedies.
77
 The states that permit cohabitants to enforce the terms of their relation-
ship do so through (1) express and implied-in-fact contracts, (2) implied-in law contracts, im-
plied joint ventures, or new status-based remedies, and (3) general equitable remedies.
78
  
I discuss each option below, but to appreciate the legal uncertainty, one needs a sense of the 
variation among cohabitating relationships. Social science research suggests that couples cohabi-
tate for numerous reasons that exhibit class and racial patterns.
79
 Students and college-educated 
women regard cohabitation as a convenience or as a testing period for marriage, while less 
wealthy and educated women cohabitate for financial reasons.
80
 In addition, many women co-
habitate because they do not view their partners as marriageable quality. A large percentage of 
cohabitants are wary divorcees.
81
 African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to cohabitate 
than White non-Hispanics, which Cynthia Bowman attributes to income inequality and greater 
 
 
74
 Table UC1, America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2013: Unmarried couples, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/cps2013UC.html (last accessed Jan. 24, 2014). See also Pamela 
J. Smock & Wendy D. Manning, Living Together Unmarried in the United States: Demographic Perspec-
tives and Implications for Family Policy, 26 LAW & POL'Y 87, 89 (2004). 
75
 Ann L. Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1401-08 (2001); Marsha 
Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 315-22. 
See also J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, and the Emerging 
Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521 (2011). 
76
 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979); Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 
1977). 
77
 See, e.g. Cates v. Swain, -- So. 3d --, 2013 WL 1831783 (Miss. May 2, 2013); In re Marriage of 
Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 2004); Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 2000); Bo-
land v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 144-46 (Conn. 1987).  
78
 This conceptual map was articulated in an influential 1976 case from the California Supreme 
Court, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976). See also Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep. 3079 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979). Marvin did not generate broad experimentation with implied or equitable remedies, 
see Estin, supra  note 75, 1401-08; Garrison, supra note 75, 315-22, but its articulation of the available 
options still structures the legal imagination.  
79
 See generally Smock & Manning, supra note 74. For a survey of the empirical literature, see 
Cynthia Bowman, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 103-123 (2010).  
80
 Bowman, supra note 79, at 103-04, 107-109 
81
 Id. at 117 (in 51.5% of cohabiting relationships, at least one cohabitant has been divorced).  
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cultural acceptance of consensual unions.
82
 Of course, cohabitants often have different expecta-
tions for their relationship, and these expectations change over time. Given this laundry list of 
possible reasons for cohabiting, it is unsurprising that cohabitation is less stable than marriage. 
Half of cohabitating relationships in the United States end with separation or marriage in two 
years.
83
 Even in Europe, where cohabitation is more common and has greater social support, a 
majority of cohabitating relationships end in less than five years.
84
 In contrast, only 20% percent 
of marriages end within five years and a majority never divorce. Given the variation among co-
habiting relationships and their fragility, legal regulation is challenging, to say the least.  
1. Breach of contract 
First, all but two American jurisdictions will enforce express cohabitation contracts.
85
 How-
ever, these contracts are limited in several ways. Several states limit enforcement to express or to 
written contracts, out of pragmatic concerns typical for statutes of frauds, such as the ease of 
false allegations, the lengthiness of court battles and the difficulty of determining precise terms.
86
 
In addition, while courts will acknowledge that cohabitants expect a sexual relationship, only 
promises severable from the sexual relationship can be enforced.
87
 And, as in marital agree-
ments, courts may refuse to enforce provisions governing everyday life. Robert Ellickson has 
observed that the commercial firms selling model cohabitation agreements advise clients that 
courts will not enforce clauses relating to “the day-to-day details” of their relationship, such as 
 
 
82
 Id. at 110-17, 135-36. 
83
 Andrew Cherlin, THE MARRIAGE GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN 
AMERICA TODAY, 206 App. (2010). In addition, 49% of cohabitating couples will split within 5 years 
compared to 20% of first marriages. Bramlett MD and Mosher WD, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, 
and Remarriage in the United States, Center for Disesase Control, National Center for Health Statistics, 
Vital Health Stat. 23(22) (2002) http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf .  
84
 Kathleen Kiernan, Changing European Families: Trends and Issues, BLACKWELL COMPANION 
TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF FAMILIES (Scott, Jacqueline, Judith Treas, and Martin Richards, eds. 2003).  
85
 Supra note 76.  
86
 MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 26.01 (2007); Posik v. Layton, 695 
So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1997); Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992). Morone v. 
Morone, 13 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980) (written contracts). 
87
 Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410 (Cal. App. 4th 1988) (claim for services as 
“companion” severable from services for “chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, partner and business counse-
lor”); Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78-79 (Cal. App. 4th 1993) (“services as a social companion 
and hostess” insufficient consideration because they “are not normally compensated and are inextricably 
intertwined with the sexual relationship”). But see Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1st 
1981) (promise to be “lover” rendered entire agreement, including domestic services, unenforceable); 
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housecleaning, cooking, care of pets or home decoration.
88
 Nevertheless, California courts have 
enforced contract claims relating to domestic services,
89
 and a Florida court has enforced a sup-
port agreement in which the cohabitant promised to “perform housework, yard work, provision[] 
the house, and cook[]for the parties.”90 
In addition to express contracts, several states permit cohabitants to bring limited implied-in-
fact contracts. Even if the parties never expressed promises orally, a court may infer from their 
conduct that they intended to exchange services with the expectation of compensation.
91
 Plain-
tiffs alleging implied-in-fact contracts face special hurdles. Due to their “special relationship,” a 
cohabitant may have to rebut a presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously.
92
 In ad-
dition, some states limit implied-in-fact contract claims to business or commercial services be-
tween cohabitants, expressly excluding domestic services.
93
  
2. Conscriptive rules  
Estin identifies three groups of states that apply property-sharing rules to long-term cohabit-
ants.
94
 First, California, West Virginia and Wisconsin apply a “generous” theory of implied-in-
fact contracts.
95
 Even if the couple did not intend to exchange services for compensation, a court 
 
 
88
 Ellickson, Unpacking the Household, 116 Yale L.J. 226, 313 (2006) (citing Ihara et al., LIVING 
TOGETHER: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 3/3; Katherine Stoner & Shae Iving, PRENUP-
TIAL AGREEMENTS 2/7 (2004)).  
89
 Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410.  
90
 Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See also Forrest v. Ron, 821 
So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (mother promised to move in with father of her child as a 
reconciliation period if he promised to pay for her to reestablish her own residence if it did not work out). 
91
 See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 667 (1984); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922, 928 
(Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1987); Roznowski v. Bozyk, 251 N.W.2d 606, 608-09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Small 
v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1982). Some courts reject the distinction between 
implied and express contracts, arguing that in both cases the court must use the parties’ conduct to infer 
the precise content of their intended promises. Cook, 691 P.2d at 667; Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 
902, 906 (1979); Hudson, 732 S.W.2d at 928 (citations omitted). 
92
 Featherston v. Steinhoff, 226 Mich. App. 584, 592 (1997) (plaintiff failed to overcome pre-
sumption of gratuitousness to establish implied in fact contract); Roznowski, 73 Mich. App. at 409. 
93
 See, e.g. Tapley v. Tapley, 122 N.H. 727, 730 (1982); Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 752 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (declining to extend implied-in-fact contract theory to domestic services). 
94
 Estin, supra note 75, at 1391-95. 
95
 Id. (citing Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110; Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 439 (W.Va. 1990); Watts 
v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313-14 (Wis. 1987).). Wisconsin is more of a joint venture state, as it “does 
not recognize recompense for housekeeping or other services unless the services are linked to an accumu-
lation of wealth or assets during the relationship.” Waage v. Borer, 525 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Wis. 1994). New 
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may order support payments or a division of property, if their couple's conduct manifested a mu-
tual intention to share property or support one another long term. This theory has radical poten-
tial because it does not rely on an exchange of promises, promissory reliance or unjust enrich-
ment. However, several authors have noted that its impact on case law appears, at least anecdo-
tally, to be limited.
96
  
Second, Kansas and Oregon have applied an implied joint venture theory to cohabitants. Us-
ing an analogy with business partnerships, these states divide cohabitants’ property if they in-
tended to manage their assets and expenses jointly for their common benefit.
97
 Living together is 
evidence that the couple intended to manage their resources jointly, but it is less important than 
holding joint accounts, entering into joint transactions or making “substantial economic and non-
economic contributions to the household.”98 If the court finds an implied joint venture, it will 
divide any assets acquired during the cohabitation equitably. This remedy, of course, is valuable 
only to the extent that the couple acquired divisible assets. 
Last, courts in Washington and Nevada have developed an alternative status-based regime 
for cohabiting couples.
 99
 These states will divide cohabitant’s property according to community 
property rules if the relationship sufficiently resembles a marriage (they will not award alimony). 
Courts evaluate the relationship according to traditional marital expectations: duration of cohabi-
tation, pooling of financial resources and services, contributions to joint projects, the purposes of 
the relationship, whether they had children and how they described their relationship to others 
(citation). The couple’s intent is relevant, but the question is not whether they had an agreement 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jersey once recognized a similarly generous implied promise theory, In re Estate of Roccamonte, 174 N.J. 
381, 808 A.2d 838 (2002), but those cases were overruled by an amendment to the statutes of frauds 
providing that palimony agreements must be in writing. N.J.S.A. 25:1–5(h). 
96
 Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1365, 1370-72 (2001) (discussing Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)); 
Bowman, supra note 79, at 42-43, 51 (discussing Friedman, Waage, 525 N.W.2d 95, and Ward v. Jahnke, 
583 N.W.2d 656 (Wis. 1998)).  
97
 Estin, supra note 75, at 1391; Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507 OR (1978); Eaton v. Johnston, 681 
P.2d 606, 610-11 (Kan. 1984). Oregon courts calls these relationships “domestic partnerships.” Estin also 
includes Mississippi in this category because the Mississippi Supreme Court appeared to endorse a right 
to equitable division (Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875-76 (Miss. 1986)), but Mississippi subse-
quently limited that right to cohabitants who “had . . . either been married [before resuming cohabitation] 
or contended to have married.” Nichols v. Funderburk, 883 So. 2d 554, 558 (Miss. 2004). Cp.. 
98
 In re Baker, 223 P.3d 417, 421 (Or. 2009). See also In re Greulich, 243 P.3d 110, 115 (Or. 
2010).  
99
 W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Nev. 1992); Connell v. Francisco, 898 
P.2d 831, 835-36 (Wash. 1995). Nevada’s case law began with an implied-in-fact contract theory, but 
now places less emphasis on the inferred agreement. Cp. Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 675 (Nev. 1984) with 
Estate of Shapiro, 634 F.3d 1055.  
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or contract but whether they intended to adopt an interdependent relationship. In its 2001 Princi-
ples of Family Dissolution, the American Law Institute recommended a similar approach. The 
ALI Principles treat an unmarried couple as “domestic partners” if they cohabitated continuously 
for a defined period and jointly managed their household; have a common child; or meet a num-
ber of factors regarding financial independence, intimacy and public reputation. Domestic part-
ners and married couples are subject to the same equitable division and alimony rules. This pro-
vision created substantial academic controversy and has not been adopted directly by any state.  
Marsha Garrison, somewhat tendentiously, labels these three categories of rules “conscrip-
tive” obligations. The label is accurate for the new status rules and, perhaps, the “generous” im-
plied-in-fact contracts. These doctrines consider the couples’ intentions but also impose duties on 
a couple regardless of their intentions. Of course, even here, the imposed duties are default rules 
that the couple can avoid through express contracts. The label is more misleading for the implied 
contract and joint venture doctrines. These doctrines direct courts to infer the parties’ intent from 
their conduct. The law is not conscripting couples into a status they never contemplated but try-
ing to enforce obligations that they assumed with respect to one another. If, in fact, a couple 
avoided marriage precisely to avoid sharing obligations, the law should not imply a contract or 
partnership.  
Nevertheless, insofar as the doctrinal analysis for implied contract or joint venture doctrines 
is overinclusive, courts will impose duties on couples who did not intend to have them. Joint 
venture cases consider factors similar to the new status rules, some of which are only loosely re-
lated to the couple’s intent to adopt sharing obligations. Cohabiting, for instance, is a necessary 
element in all seven states, but living together is, at best, weak evidence of intentions to share 
property or services.
100
 A couple could live together without exchanging services or exchange 
services without living together. Why not ask directly whether they intended to share services? 
Furthermore, some factors bear no clear relationship to sharing intentions. Why must claimants 
be a romantic couple at all?
101
  
Despite their radical potential, the practical significance of these new cohabitation doctrines 
should not be overemphasized. Reported cases applying these rules are sparse, the courts have 
 
 
100
 E.g., Bergen, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 859 (concluding cohabitation is necessary); But see Devaney 
v. L'Esperance, 195 N.J. 247, 257 (2008) (recognizing theoretical possibility of establishing marriage-like 
relationship without cohabitation, but finding marriage like relationship not present).  
101
 Cp. Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What is Marriage-Like Like--The Irrelevance of Conju-
gality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269 (2001) (arguing that sex, once the defining feature of the “conjugal rela-
tions” accorded state benefits, is now less important under Canadian law). 
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been hesitant to expand them, and the courts tend to impose substantial evidentiary burdens for 
successful claims.
102
  
3. Restitution  
Last, in recent years, states have expanded unjust enrichment or restitution to protect persons 
who contributed to property held by a cohabitant or provided services without payment.
103
 The 
cohabitation cases that suggest restitution claims follow several standard fact patterns. Most cas-
es involve real property, usually a shared home. Either the plaintiff transferred the title to his or 
her home to a cohabitant, paid the purchase price or the mortgage for property titled only in the 
defendant’s name, or made improvements to the defendant’s property.104 The plaintiff cohabitant 
may also have worked for or with the defendant in a family business.
105
 In other cases, the plain-
tiff paid for the couples’ living expenses, such as the cost of food or rent. The most difficult cas-
es are those in which the cohabitant performed domestic services, which freed the defendant to 
pursue paid wage labor and accumulate property.
106
  
Restitution doctrines have been stretched in various ways to cover some, but not all, of these 
scenarios. In 2011, the A.L.I. adopted the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment that covers cohabitants. Section 28 provides  
If two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship resembling marriage, and if 
one of them owns a specific asset to which the other has made substantial, uncompen-
sated contributions in the form of property or services, the person making such contribu-
tions has a claim in restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust enrich-
ment upon the dissolution of the relationship.
107
 
Section 28 is limited to cohabiting relationships that resemble marriage and does not extend 
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to other cohabitants, like roommates, or personal relationships, like friends, siblings or par-
ents.
108
 As noted in its comments, § 28 relaxes two general limits on restitution.
109
 Cohabitants 
may recover transfers, even if they appear to have been voluntary gifts and even if the plaintiff 
reasonably could have, but deliberately chose not to, negotiate a contractual exchange. The au-
thors concluded that most transfers between cohabitants are made with a reasonable expectation 
of sharing in future benefits and that cohabitants should not be forced to enter contracts to avoid 
assuming the risk that the relationship will fall apart.
110
  
Estin provides a useful grouping of the factual contexts in which cohabitants successfully re-
cover in restitution. Cohabitants receive restitution for money or services contributed to the oth-
er’s property or business,111 but cohabitants typically fail to recover money or services that “can 
be characterized as part of the ordinary give-and-take of a shared life,” such as domestic chores 
or living expenses.
112
 Even if one cohabitant contributed more to the couple's domestic life, 
courts assume that the couple received a mutual benefit and refuse (as in marriage) to balance 
their relationship ledgers. 
C. The “Abolish Marriage” Position 
The legal literature is full of suggestions to reform the law of intimacy. One limited proposal 
is to replace marriage with civil unions, leaving couples or religious groups to bestow the title 
“marriage.”113 Another is to create a “menu of options” by formalizing the alternative statuses, so 
couples may choose the rights that best reflect their relationship.
114
 A third “functionalist” pro-
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posal would retain marriage and extend similar rights to any relationship with similar character-
istics.
115
 The most radical proposal is simply to abolish relationship status. Influential theorists of 
various political persuasions have floated this proposal, including Judith Butler,
116
 Martha Fine-
man,
117
 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler,
118
 and David Boaz.
119
 The proposal has been explored 
more extensively by others.
120
 In these proposals, individuals may marry as a cultural, religious 
or moral matter, but the state will no longer license specific types of relationships. These theo-
rists would prefer intimates regulate their lives through contracts, although some of them also 
contemplate extending equity, partnership and even employment law to intimate couples.
121
 This 
section will discuss this proposal to abolish status relationships, noting the variety of normative 
concerns and their proposed replacements for marriage.  
The argument for abolishing marriage is that it no longer serves its intended functions, in part 
because those functions are no longer appropriate. A traditional purpose of marriage law – per-
haps its primary one – was to enforce conventional norms regarding sexuality and gender. Mar-
 
 
115
 Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 225 (2003); 
James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 65 (2003); Edward Stein, Look-
ing Beyond Full Relationship Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or 
Functionalism, 28 LAW & INEQ. 345, 371-72 (2010) (functional features include “emotional commitment 
and involvement; financial commitment and entanglement; mutual reliance for personal services includ-
ing shelter, food, clothing, utilities, health care, etc.; how parties in a relationship have conducted them-
selves in their personal lives and held themselves out to society; their level of intimacy; and the totality of 
the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring, and self-sacrifice of the parties.”);  
116
 Judith Butler, Competing Universalities, in CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY 137, 
176-77 (2000).  
117
 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS 29-69 
(Anita Bernstein ed. 2006); THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 95-141 (2004). 
118
 Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Privatizing Marriage, 91 MONIST 377, 379, 386 (2008) (rec-
ommending replacing marriage with private contracts or, as a second best, with universal civil unions). 
Their proposal is, understandably, tentative. They later endorse replacing marriage with civil unions, as an 
accommodation to pragmatic political concerns, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, NUDGE 216 (2009), and 
Sunstein had previously expressed a preference to retain marriage. Cass Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2084, 2117-18 (2004). 
119
 David Boaz, Privatize Marriage: A Simple Solution to the Gay-Marriage Debate, SLATE 
(Apr. 25, 1997), http://www.slate.com/id/2440/.  
120
 Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil 
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006); Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Taking Government Out 
of the Marriage Business: Families Would Benefit 70-71, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS (Anita Bernstein ed. 
2006); Jessica Knouse, Civil Marriage: Threat to Democracy, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 361, 417-18 
(2012); Anibal Rosario-Lebron, For Better and for Better: The Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 5 
WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 189, 251-52 (2013). 
121
 Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, supra note 117, at 58.  
25  GREGG STRAUSS VOL. 90:X 
 
riage was a state license to engage in sexual behavior and reproduction, which society used to 
enforce its vision of correct sexual behavior and gender roles, particularly against women and 
minorities.
122
 The proponents of abolishing marriage argue that these are morally and legally in-
appropriate uses of power in a liberal state. The law should not enforce gendered social norms, 
and adults should have the liberty to engage in sex, bear children and structure their intimate re-
lationships without state interference. Aside from the narrative problems, marriage law is no 
longer an effective tool for these purposes, as evidenced by the prevalence of sex and child rear-
ing outside of marriage. 
Of course, no one denies that marriage law could be used to protect dependent children and 
women. However, marriage policy is an inefficient tool for these purposes. If the state’s concern 
is child welfare, supporting marriage is both over- and under-inclusive. Not all children live with 
married adults, and not all married adults have children. Over 40% of children born in the United 
States between 2006 and 2010 were born to unmarried women.
123
 Even if a child is born to mar-
ried parents, there is a 20% chance they will divorce by her ninth birthday.
124
 Childcare is also 
not limited to parents, as grandparents are the primary caregiver for four percent of children.
125
 
Moreover, while empirical evidence suggests that children benefit from living with two parents, 
the effect is mediated by the quality of the adult relationship. Children raised by parents in abu-
sive or high-tension relationships may benefit from divorce,
126
 and children living with lone par-
ents score higher on welfare measures than those with a stepparent or a parent’s cohabitant.127  
Marriage law may even interfere with the protection of women and children. Martha Fine-
man, the most influential family law scholar to propose abolishing status, argues that marriage 
law distorts public policy with respect to dependents.
128
 The public is obligated to care for chil-
dren, the disabled and the elderly, because dependency is a universal human experience and care-
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taking is necessary for social reproduction. Yet, instead of subsidizing caretaking as a public 
good, marriage policy shunts this obligation onto private families. Moreover, this privatization of 
dependency reinforces gender inequality, because women are the vast majority of caretakers and 
much of American law assumes a breadwinner family that reinforces this gendered division of 
labor.  
Last, marriage law can foster forms of direct and indirect discrimination. The title “married” 
has social signaling functions that can be useful or detrimental. For instance, the presumption 
that marriages are monogamous can ease interactions with other adults. This signaling value can 
also serve less innocuous purposes. In our society and many others, people regard marriage as 
the most significant relationship, and consequently, marriage often signifies social achievement. 
This prestige can be used to exclude others and, in turn, is reinforced by such exclusion. Oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage, for instance, use the state’s licensing scheme to denigrate same-sex 
relationships and, in the process, extol heterosexual marriage. Proponents of abolishing marriage 
argue that any state involvement in bestowing titles on relationships reinforces such exclusionary 
practices.  
In addition, marriage classifies adults into “single” or “married.” Many relationships, from 
cohabitants to separated spouses to “open” marriages, do not fit neatly into this blunt dichotomy. 
This imprecision can lead to unfairness, because many state and private benefits are contingent 
on marital status. Why, for instance, should a person receive social security benefits from a 
spouse that he never supported, while a second person cannot receive benefits from her commit-
ted, long-term cohabitant? Similarly, single people receive less compensation for the same em-
ployment, because married persons benefit more from insurance benefits. Such discrimination 
might be unfair for two reasons. Some theorists argue that, as a general matter, it is wrong to dis-
criminate based on relationship status.
129
 More plausibly, discrimination is problematic when 
relationship status is unrelated to the rationale for the underlying benefit. If the state abolished 
marriage, it could no longer be a proxy for these benefits. Either benefits would be distributed 
based only on functionally relevant criteria or individuals could designate their beneficiaries. 
In summary, despite otherwise divergent normative agendas, proponents of abolishing mar-
riage typically appeal to three core arguments. First, individuals have a liberty right to structure 
their intimate relationships without state interference. Second, child welfare is an implausible 
justification for such interference, because the state has more effective and less distorting means 
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to promote child welfare than imposing status-based duties between adults. Finally, marriage fa-
cilitates gender inequality and discrimination based on relationship status.
130
 
As is obvious in the foregoing discussion, these authors take marriage as their primary target. 
While they support abolishing relationship status generally, many of their criticisms apply to 
marriage in particular. Nevertheless, it is essential to understand what they imagine the legal re-
lationships between intimates would look like without status relations. (I will expand on this dis-
cussion in Section III.) For most theorists, contracts play the pivotal role. Libertarian reformers, 
such as Boaz, argue that intimate partners should govern their relationship through ordinary con-
tract law.
131
 In a similar vein, Sunstein recommends contractual ordering with tailored default 
rules. Couples could enter contracts, which would be supplemented by “a menu of default rules, 
perhaps intended to mimic what most people would do, perhaps intended to force the parties to 
make their wishes clear, perhaps intended to protect those most in need of protection.”132 Even 
liberal proponents of abolishing marriage envision contract law playing the central role. Martha 
Fineman argues that if intimate affiliates “want their relationships to have legally enforceable 
consequences, they should bargain for them.”133  
In addition, Sunstein and Fineman recognize that other areas of law might continue to play a 
role in intimate relationships. Because Fineman discusses this topic in greater detail, I will focus 
on her account. She argues that “ameliorating doctrines” would be available to alleviate the po-
tentially harsh results of pure private ordering on economically weaker parties.
134
 Adult intimate 
relationships would be governed by general rules of contract, tort, equity, and, perhaps, even 
partnership and labor law. She declines to define this new legal regime in detail, but she does 
sketch a few of its contours. For instance, if a cohabitant provides services without a contract, 
then she can seek compensation through unjust enrichment, partnership default rules or labor 
regulations. However, any rules devised for these purposes must “apply to all types of transac-
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tions between legally competent adults and . . . specific categories of affiliation will not be seg-
regated for different treatment.”135  
Although Fineman acknowledges “pouring disputes that arise between sexual affiliates into 
the arenas of contract, tort and criminal law would not leave the doctrines that govern those areas 
of law untransformed,” she offers only two examples of the likely transformations.136 First, tort 
law might develop ways to “compensate sexual affiliates for conduct endemic to family interac-
tions but considered unacceptable among strangers,” such as by modifying “the norms that pro-
hibit harassment, verbal assault, and emotional abuse among strangers” so that they could “be 
applied in defining appropriate conduct between sexual intimates.”137 Second, if the state stops 
trying to limit reproduction to marriage, it might decriminalize sexual conduct and permit “en-
forceable individualized bargaining over sex outside the marital contract.”138 She suggests, in 
conclusion, that traditional doctrines will require reexamination where they make “assumptions 
about interactions between independent, equal and autonomous individuals.”139 
In the next section, I use these proposals to abolish marriage as a launching pad and explore 
what it would be like to subject intimate relationships to traditional contract, tort and equity law. 
I do not intend to offer a systematic treatment of the necessary changes. Instead, I hope to identi-
fy a trend – namely, that even if the law abolished ex ante status categories, standard private law 
doctrines would still require discrimination based on “categories of affiliation.” 
The state cannot get out of the marriage business. Abolishing relationship licenses like mar-
riage would not abolish the regulation of intimacy based on status; it would simply alter the regu-
latory regime.
140
 As long as intimates can bring legal claims against one another in tort, contract, 
or equity, private law will determine who can have obligations, how they arise, how they change, 
and what their default content will be. Moreover, private law tailors these rules to the nature of 
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couples are now. This is a reasonable response to alarmist reactions against the proposal to abolish mar-
riage, but the comparison can be misleading because cohabitation law develops in dialogue with marriage 
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our relationships. If a state abolished intimate relationship licenses, then private law would re-
fashion ad hoc categories of intimate status. In this section, I describe central doctrines in tort, 
contract, and equity that tailor private law rights to the nature of parties’ relationships and require 
the law to use status-based norms. To be clear, I am not arguing in this section for regulation 
through marital status or against regulation through private law, only that private law regulation 
cannot avoid status-based norms.  
A. Tort 
Tort law often draws distinctions based on the parties’ intimate relationship. Relationships 
are irrelevant for many classic intentional torts, but they are central to modern intentional torts 
and negligence. Absent fundamental changes in tort law, tort law claims between intimate cou-
ples will require the law to employ status-based norms.  
With few exceptions, the parties’ relationship rarely affects classic intentional torts. Assault, 
battery and rape are as wrong when committed by an intimate partner as by a stranger (if not 
worse). The law has evolved slowly to reflect this moral equivalence. Every state has now abol-
ished general spousal tort immunity. Tort claims for intimate rape or domestic violence remain 
rare, but states and activists are searching for ways to protect these victims.
141
 On the other hand, 
other aspects of tort law are explicitly tailored to the parties’ relationship. A set of intentional 
torts protects legal rights that are sensitive to the nature of our relationships. These relationship-
sensitive torts often include a reasonableness element that permits juries to tailor claims to case-
specific facts about the relationship. Other tort rules impose different legal duties on parties with 
a “special relationship,” including parents, carriers, property owners, fiduciaries, lawyers, physi-
cians, and others.  
I will begin with relationship-sensitive torts. These tort law claims necessarily use standards 
tailored to the parties’ relationship, and this tailoring inevitably involves normative judgments 
about appropriate behavior for their type of relationship. Status plays this role most clearly for 
torts that require “outrageous” or “offensive” behavior. Consider the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. A plaintiff is entitled to compensation for emotional injuries if a defend-
ant’s “extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
harm.”
142
 Intimate partners are uniquely positioned to harm one another emotionally, which 
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makes intimate relationships a natural source of IIED claims. However, to adjudicate an IIED 
claim between intimate parties, the law must decide what behavior is “extreme and outrageous” 
in the context of their relationship. How could tort law make these judgments without status-
based norms? I am not the first person to raise these questions, of course.  
Ira Ellman and Stephen Sugarman have argued that we should not permit IIED claims be-
tween spouses because there can be no judicially administrable standard for outrageous marital 
behavior.
143
 Ellman and Sugarman argue that the law has two options, neither of which his ac-
ceptable. Extreme and outrage conduct may be defined “internally” according to the parties’ rela-
tionship or “externally” according to social conventions. The internal standard is meant to re-
spect marital privacy and diversity but has the opposite effect.
144
 The standards of particular re-
lationships are too difficult to discern, because they tend to be “informal,” “unarticulated” and 
evolving.
145
 Breakups color the parties’ memories, and the lawsuit creates incentives to distort 
the facts. Faced with such conflicting evidence, fact-finders have little option but to fill in the 
gaps using their personal or social norms. An “external” standard of conduct fairs no better. A 
couple may be content with behavior that looks extreme or outrageous to outsiders, because rela-
tionships involve “complex emotional bargains” that may “depart from social conventions” of 
healthy relationships.
146
 “Privacy norms” prevent us from holding spouses liability for conduct 
they believed was “within the bounds of the marriage.”
147
 Moreover, external standards are like-
ly abstract, which invites judges and juries to measure conduct using ideal rather than minimal 
standards.
148
 While this argument dismisses too quickly the possibility of minimal objective 
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Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 49-54 (1982).  
143
 Ira Mark Ellman and Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort? 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1268, 1341-42 (1996). They conclude that the law should ban IIED claims between spouses, except 
when emotional harm is caused by a small list of acts that are otherwise actionable crimes or torts. I am 
less interested in their ultimate conclusion than in their argument. 
144
 Id. at 1320-22 (discussing Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. App. 1991)). Massey 
approved an IIED instruction stating that “[t]he bounds of decency vary from legal relationship to legal 
relationship. The marital relationship is highly subjective and constituted by mutual understanding and 
interchanges which are constantly in flux, and any number of which could be viewed by some segment of 
society as outrageous. In your deliberation on the questions, definitions and instructions that follow, you 
shall consider them only in the context of the marital relationship of the parties to this case.” 
145
 Id. at 1321-22. 
146
 Id. at 1323-24. 
147
 Id. 
148
 Id. at 1325-26.  
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standards,
149
 Ellman and Sugarman identify a fundamental problem. Our beliefs about proper 
intimate behavior are often indeterminate and, consequently, the law has difficulty defining even 
minimal standards of intimate conduct without relying on social or moral norms.  
This problem, however, in not distinct to marriage or intimate relationships. It arises for any 
IIED claim. Imagine a personal assistant suing his boss, a student suing his teacher, or a person 
suing his neighbor. As the Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes, judgments under the extreme 
and offensive standard requires contextual judgments about the parties’ relationship, authority, 
vulnerability, motivations and past conduct.
150
 Liberal theorists are naturally reticent to articulate 
or impose norms on intimate couples, but there is no viable alternative for IIED claims, even if 
the starte abolished formal status categories. 
The law might try to limit consideration to the parties’ explicit intentions. However, few rela-
tionships (intimate or not) are governed solely or even primarily by explicit norms. Our expecta-
tions are incomplete. They are abstract, vague, mutable, and contextual, and couples often have 
divergent expectations. This kind of indeterminacy is not a problem in personal relationships. 
Couples can fill in their expectations on the fly, making contextual judgments based on evolving 
values. Yet, this indeterminacy does cause problems for legal enforcement. The law must make 
determinate judgments. The only way for the law to fill in these gaps is to make the same type of 
judgments that that intimates ordinarily make for themselves. The fact-finder must interpret the 
couple’s relationship in light of their values and in light of normative judgments about what is 
appropriate for that kind of relationship. 
Similar difficulties arise in privacy torts, such as “intrusion on solitude.” One may sue anoth-
er “who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon [his] solitude or seclusion … or his 
private affairs or concerns, . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son.”151 Searching another person’s closet without his consent is a paradigmatic intrusion on soli-
tude. Yet, is such a search equally unreasonable if the closet belongs to a stranger, acquaintance, 
friend, lover, roommate or spouse?
152
 Part of this difference can be explained by consent. Once I 
 
 
149
 They discuss cases involving conduct to which no one ought to be subject regardless of past 
acquiescence, such as being locked out of the house in the snow, withholding financial resources, public 
and private humiliation, Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, and sexual humiliation. Twyman v. Twymany, 855 
S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. 1993). Their hesitance rests on wariness of distrust of juries and a desire to restrict 
remedies to divorce, but in our hypothetical world divorce is not an option.  
150
 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 46, cmt. d. (2012). 
151
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). 
152
 Sanders v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 907, 918, 978 P.2d 67, 73 (Cal. 1999) 
(“Privacy for purposes of the intrusion tort must be evaluated with respect to the identity of the alleged 
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give someone permission to enter my bedroom, his choice to exceed that privilege by searching 
my closet is less offensive than if he lacked consent to enter my bedroom at all. Ultimately, how-
ever, privacy torts exceed implied consent and rest on shared public conventions.
153
 Our privacy 
law begins with conventional norms about what one shares with strangers, reporters, employers, 
party guests, friends, roommates, lovers and spouses. Individuals have the power to redraw these 
boundaries, and that power may even be necessary to form intimate relationships.
154
 Neverthe-
less, the default boundaries are set by social norms for people in specific kinds of relationships. 
In privacy torts, the reasonable person standard incorporates these social norms, just as the out-
rageous conduct standard does for IIED claims.  
What about the second class of relationship differences in tort law, the “special relation-
ships”? The default rule in negligence is that everyone has a duty to use reasonable prudence to 
avoid causing harm to others, but no positive duty to help or protect others.
155
 The law alters this 
default for parties with a “special relationship”: carriers and passengers, innkeepers and guests, 
businesses and invitees, employers and employees, landlords and tenants, prisons and prisoners, 
professionals and clients
156
 and children and parents.
157
 Special relationships typically arise from 
voluntary undertakings in which the defendant has assumed greater power, has a distinctive abil-
ity to prevent injury, or has induced the plaintiff into a situation of dependency. These relation-
ships can raise or lower the defendant’s standard of care or create an affirmative duty for a de-
fendant to prevent harm to the plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                                                             
intruder and the nature of the intrusion.”) Similar questions arise when a plaintiff objects to an intrusion 
into the space that he or she shares with another person, such as a roommate or cohabitant.  
153
 Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 843, 851-60 (2002). 
154
 Charles Fried, Privacy (A Moral Analysis), in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 203, 209 (Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed.,1984). 
155
 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 37 (2012). 
156
 Id. § 40. See also W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984). 
157
 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 40, cmt. o (2012) (“One likely candidate for an addition nto 
recognize special relationships is the one among family members … particularly among those residing in 
the same household.”). A minority of states subject parental decisions to the ordinary standard of reason-
able care, another minority apply a general standard of care unless the claim involves parental supervision 
or discretion, while roughly half maintain a parental immunity from suit with limited exceptions. 
Romualdo P. Eclavea, Liability of parent for injury to unemancipated child caused by parent’s negli-
gence—modern cases, 6 A.L.R.4th 1066 §§ 3, 13 (Originally published in 1981); Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. 
Hayden and Ellen M. Bublick, THE LAW OF TORTS § 358 (2d ed.). Cp. Vincent R. Elizabeth G. Porter, 
Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533 (2013) (arguing for general stand-
ard of reasonable parental care) with David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the "Free Range Kid": 
Is Overprotective Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947 (2012) (arguing that 
criminal child neglect standards threaten to impose disputable parenting ideals). 
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If the state abolishes licensed status categories, would intimacy be recognized as a “special 
relationship”? It might seem odd, once the state abolished formal status categories, for tort law to 
recreate distinctions between types of intimate relationships. However, this tension will remain 
regardless. Even if intimacy does not carry special tort duties, negligence law will still regulate 
intimacy using a status-based assumption: namely, that intimate duties are more like duties to 
strangers than to employees, tenants or clients. Consider, for example, the duty to rescue. If inti-
mates are legal strangers, then they have no positive duty to aid one another in emergencies. This 
is certainly contrary to common moral intuitions. We have a positive moral duty to aid our 
spouses, a duty stronger than our duty to aid passengers. Should a person be liable for not throw-
ing a life preserver to his husband (hopefully now his ex-husband)? The law would have to de-
fine the scope of this affirmative duty. Should he also be liable for refusing to help pay for his 
husband’s medical care? Similar questions arise for premises liability. Should a person be liable 
for failing to warn her boyfriend about her broken front step? If the boyfriend stayed over regu-
larly for the past month?
158
 Intimacy is an appropriate candidate for special tort duties, since 
spouses and cohabitants often have a unique ability to prevent injuries to one another and moral 
responsibility to do so. Whether the law decides to treat intimates like strangers or like carriers or 
professionals, the choice reflects a status-based conception of our obligations. We rarely think of 
“legal strangers” as a status, but it is a mistake to think that the default status is neutral. It is 
simply the default. 
Assuming that intimates may file tort claims against one another, the state must decide how 
their intimacy affects their rights. Under current law, tort law’s standards for offensive behavior 
and for reasonable prudence are often tailored to the nature of parties’ relationships. If tort law 
ignored intimacy, intimacy would be the anomaly. Moreover, ignoring intimacy would not mean 
avoiding status distinctions. Choosing to limit intimate parties’ tort duties to the minimal stand-
ards of legal strangers is itself a status-based judgment.  
B. Contract  
Proponents of abolishing marriage contend that if intimates want their relationship to have 
 
 
158
 A roughly equal number of states maintain traditional status-duties premises liability rules as 
have adopted a unitary standard of reasonable care for all entrants. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 Rpt. Note Cmt. a. (2012). Under a unitary standard, the question is whether a 
possessor took reasonable precautions, which in this hypothetical would depend on the extent of the cou-
ple’s relationship and her boyfriend’s exposure to risk. 
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legal consequences, then they should enter contracts.
159
 As we have just seen, relationships often 
alter our tort duties even without contracts. Nevertheless, the proponents of abolishing marriage 
correctly note that spouses and cohabitants exchange economically valuable services.
160
 We cook 
meals, mow lawns, clean laundry, fix computers, repair homes, plan vacations, balance check-
books, make investments, and care for one another during illnesses. All of these services could 
be out-sourced. Instead, they become bundled into status obligations. Could these intimate duties 
be enforced through contract without intimacy-based distinctions?
161
 While it is more natural to 
recognize that tort law imposes duties on individuals, contract law, the paradigm of voluntary 
legal obligations, also tailors its rules to the nature of our relationships. Ordinary contract doc-
trines regarding formation, interpretation and remedies inevitably embroil the law in judgments 
about the nature of our relationships.
162
 
1. Contract formation 
Consider, first, what is required for intimate partners to enter binding contracts for economic 
services such as domestic or wage labor. The first hurdle is formation—offer, acceptance and 
consideration. Where are the offer and the acceptance? Intimate partners rarely make explicit ar-
rangements for dividing economic services, and even when they do, their arrangements fluctuate. 
Marriage is the closest most couples come to a moment of agreement, but most couples have lit-
tle explicit sense of what their marital life will be like. Even sophisticated couples with intricate 
prenuptial agreements rarely divvy up ordinary household tasks. Similarly, cohabitants may de-
cide to move in together and make agreements about rent or bills, but they rarely negotiate 
 
 
159
 Fineman, supra note 117, at 58; Cain, supra note 140, at 46-48. Presumably, these authors are 
not thinking about fiduciary relationships created by contract. When individuals contracts create relation-
ships of trust and confidence, often the law imposes fiduciary obligations on the parties. Contract gives 
rises to status obligations.  
160
 The law often ignores the value of these services, particularly the services associated with of 
women. Silbaugh, supra note 31. 
161
 Many scholars have addressed whether marriage is a contract and whether the law should al-
low spouses to alter their marital duties contractually. See e.g. Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and 
the Meaning of Marriage, 54 AZ. L. REV. 11 (2012); Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 249 (2010). The question I am asking is slightly different, whether law 
could recognize contracts between intimates without tailoring rules to the nature of their relationship.  
162
 Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott have argued that current marriage law approximates the de-
fault rules that hypothetical spouses would select if seeking to maximize their cooperative surplus. Mar-
riage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1284-94 (1998). Such arguments demonstrate, rather 
than contradict, my argument. If contract law needs special default rules for intimate relationships, the 
state is categorizing relationships and regulating their terms.  
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chores. More typically, couples gradually extend the time they spend together until they are ef-
fectively cohabitants. If intimate partners are going to regulate their economic lives by contract, 
almost all of them will be implied-in-fact contracts, in which the court infers the parties’ promis-
es from their conduct.  
In addition, the provision of economic support (domestic and wage) in intimate relationships 
raises difficulties under standard consideration doctrines.
163
 Under the predominant modern rule, 
consideration is “the exchange or price requested and received by the promisor for its prom-
ise.”164 When intimate partners perform services for one another, their intention is often precisely 
not to bargain for something in exchange.
165
 It is integral to the moral and social ideal of intimate 
relationships that we offer our services freely, as part of being in that relationship. That does not 
mean we do not expect reciprocity. We expect our partners to contribute, and we hope to receive 
as much as we give. Many of us expect our partners to contribute an equal amount, but we want 
them to offer the contribution freely. Intimates do not value their contributions to the relationship 
and seek to maximize the return on that contribution.
166
  
Even if the law decides to treat economic services as bargained-for in a relationship, it is un-
clear how to characterize the bargained-for benefits. Two people might simply trade economic 
services, but most couples view their provision of domestic services as an intricate part of their 
relationship, including all of its attendant benefits. Spouses often agree to share income and 
chores as part of sharing a home and a life, not simply because division of labor is efficient. Lov-
 
 
163
 Some courts have argued that spouses have a pre-existing marital duty to provide such domes-
tic support, so that promise cannot be consideration. E.g. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18-20 
(1st Dist.1993) (refusing to enforce a husband’s promise to bequeath his wife a portion of his separate 
property if she provided nursing for him in the home rather than in a nursing home). This argument has 
been justly criticized, Silbaugh, supra note 31, at 30-33, but whatever its merits, it would not apply if the 
law abandoned a status-based regime of marital obligations. Similarly, the modern view on martial and 
premarital agreements dispenses with a consideration requirement, but this is recognized as an exception. 
See, e.g. Formation Requirements, UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (2012).  
164
 3 Williston on Contracts § 7:2 (4th ed.) 
165
 One might think of the promise to marry as the exchange, particularly if one restricts attention 
to prenuptial agreements. However, antenutpial agreements or adjustments to the division of responsibili-
ties in an ongoing relationship will require additional consideration. Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 
600 (Tenn. 2004); Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 27 n.5 (Conn. 2011) (noting, without deciding, wheth-
er continuing marriage is consideration).  
166
 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 24-26 
(1999). I am not implying that domestic labor is not economically valuable; this argument applies equally 
to financial contributions through wage labor. Silbaugh, supra note 30, 10-11, 26-27 (arguing both unpaid 
housework and wage labor have relational and leisure components and injustice results when only house-
work is equated with emotional expression). 
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ers may agree to cohabitate because it facilitates their sexual relationship. It is artificial to view 
the exchange of wage or domestic labor in isolation from these other benefits, because the wider 
benefits may be precisely the point of the exchange. If the exchange of unpaid and paid labor be-
tween intimate partners is enforceable in contract, then the consideration cannot be limited to 
those services. Contract law would need some way to identify and value these expected benefits. 
To create a binding contract, intimate affiliates would have to make one another offers re-
garding financial, homemaking, caretaking and domestic services. They would need to place an 
economic value on their contributions to the relationship and bargain for services in return. Inti-
mates can arrange their domestic lives in this fashion, as if they were independent contractors. 
However, the proposal to abolish legal marriage requires intimates to adopt this stance, on pain 
of lacking any legal protection when their relationship ends. If the goal of abolishing marriage is 
to avoid imposing status-based norms on couples, than it is essential to realize that relying on 
contract law still forces intimates to structure the terms of their relationship to meet the demands 
of contract.  
2. Contract terms and performance 
Consider, next, the likely terms of intimate contracts. To isolate what should be an easy case 
for contractual enforcement, consider a childless marriage between two men who have roughly 
equal salaries, share a home and want an equal division of domestic labor. The terms of this 
“agreement” have several notable features. First, the couple is unlikely to bargain for a specific 
quantity or quality of services. How much sympathy would you feel for a plaintiff who claimed 
his husband breached their contract because he agreed to cook meals but skipped one day a 
week? Or worse, because his cooking was mediocre? Second, the terms of a relationship come in 
relatively indivisible bundles. Wealthy couples may hire landscapers, cooks or housekeepers, but 
the average couple agrees to share these activities en masse. In any case, if spouses have agreed 
to share labor, one spouse cannot then “hire out” his part to a contractor, even if the contractor 
would do a better job.  
Third, the terms of the agreement fluctuate because they are deeply contingent and open-
ended. Even if spouses divide their tasks explicitly ex ante, ensuring an equal division of labor 
during a relationship requires significant flexibility. The burden of these tasks varies over time: 
there are fewer dishes when the couple eats out; the yard requires less maintenance in winter; a 
new home may require more work; and wage-work commitments fluctuate. The couple must also 
decide how much they value home cooking, yard maintenance, interior decorating and their ca-
reers. These valuations change over time. In ordinary contracts, a promisor assumes the risk that 
the facts or his values will change, altering the cost or value of the exchanged promises. In a rela-
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tionship, however, both parties face this risk. Indeed, couples often make their commitments pre-
cisely to survive such drastic changes to the bargain.  
The case is more complicated still. So far, I have assumed that the spouses’ exchanges are 
limited to domestic services of the kind for which there is a market substitute. In fact, the parties’ 
exchange of services is one part of a general commitment that includes relationship maintenance, 
shared activities, emotional and physical care. Cohabitants often face this challenge to their con-
tracts. When one spouse fails to participate in these personal aspects of the relationship, why not 
conclude that he has breached the contract? It would be difficult to place a value on the domestic 
services without regard to the relational aspects—if the subjective value of a home depends on 
the presence of one’s partner, why should one not be permitted to protect that value in a con-
tract? When domestic services are enforceable in contract, then the personal or sexual aspects of 
their agreements should be enforceable as well.
167
 In one case, a court found that the plaintiff 
was excused from her promise to perform housework because the defendant breached the agree-
ment by bringing another woman into their home.
168
 
If the precise terms of a marriage are enforceable, it will affect spouses’ incentives during the 
relationships. Each partner would have an incentive to keep track of who pays for dinner, cleans 
the dishes or mows the lawn.
169
 They need an accurate tally because non-performance can justify 
a future demand for compensation and because sufficient non-performance can be a material 
breach that justifies ending the relationship and seeking damages. If one partner falls short, the 
other would have an incentive to insist on prompt performance; otherwise, a court might later 
interpret her acquiescence as a rescission of the original arrangement.
170
 If the personal or rela-
tional aspects of their relationship are enforceable as well, then that too must be kept track of. 
When one spouse stops contributing to the relationship, that breach may justify her wife in 
breaching other aspects, such as providing domestic services.
171
 
Other types of commercial relationships face similar problems: difficulty monitoring quality 
 
 
167
 Legal enforcement of sexual or relational aspects of intimate relationships can be unsavory. In 
Spires v. Spires, the court refused to enforce a contract in which a woman explicitly agreed to assume a 
subordinate role and engage in sexual acts intended to be degrading. 743 A.2d 186 (D.C. App. 1999). 
168
 Posik, 695 So. 2d at 762. 
169
 Regan has argued at length that individualistic mental accounting is inconsistent with intima-
cy. Regan, supra note 166, at 70-73; FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 147 (1993). 
170
 3 Williston on Contracts § 7:37 (4th ed.) (discussing mutual agreement to modify contract as a 
rescission and reentry into a new contract).  
171
 Posik, 695 So. 2d at 762 (finding cohabitant’s decision to move in with third party was antici-
patory breach, despite lack of contract language).  
2014 Why the State Cannot Abolish Marriage  38 
 
and quantity of performance; provision for a variety of tasks through a single relationship; and 
open-ended obligations whose cost and value change over time.
172
 These difficulties can stump 
highly sophisticated private actors. However, these difficulties do not show that is impossible or 
unwise to regulate relationships through contracts. Rather, they show that shunting intimate rela-
tionships into contract law would not end the state’s role in defining intimacy. Either intimates 
would shape their relationships to accommodate contract default rules or the law would reshape 
contract default rules to accommodate the nature of intimate relationships.  
C. Unjust Enrichment and Restitution 
Since intimate relationships often do not meet traditional standards for enforceable contracts, 
it is natural to think that equitable remedies can provide supplemental protection.
173
 Fineman, for 
instance, suggests that intimate affiliates may use equitable doctrines like unjust enrichment to 
alleviate harsh contract rules.
174
 Restitution could become generally available for intimate par-
ties, but restitution law openly relies on moral judgments about the nature of our relationships.  
The core of any restitution claim is that the plaintiff conferred on the defendant a benefit, 
which it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain.
175
 Before intimate partners can recover 
in restitution, the law must explain when it is unjust for one intimate to retain benefits received in 
a relationship. That explanation cannot avoid judging parties’ behavior in light of their beliefs 
about the relationship and in light of expectations typical for that kind of relationship. For exam-
ple, say that Caleb and Dan live together for three years with no contract. Caleb takes Dan on 
several expensive vacations and helps build a porch on Dan’s house. When they break up and 
part ways, is Dan unjustly enriched? That depends on what benefits Caleb expected and what he 
can reasonably expect. This depends, in part, on whether they were spouses, boyfriends, lovers, 
brothers, friends or roommates. One cannot understand such transfers by isolating them from 
judgments about what people owe one another in the context of particular relationships.  
 
 
172
 There is vast literature on incomplete contracts, including discussion of various avoidable and 
unavoidable reasons that contracts are incomplete.  See e.g., Robert E. Scott, A THEORY OF SELF-
ENFORCING INDEFINITE AREEMENTS, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1641 (notes 1-4 and accompany-
ing text).  
173
 Enforceable contracts (whether express or implied-in-fact) and restitution are exclusive reme-
dies, so that even a limited relationship contract should preclude recovery under quasi-contract or unjust 
enrichment. 1 Williston on Contracts §§ 1:6, 68:1 (4th ed.). 
174
 Fineman, supra note 117, at 57.  
175
 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 (2011); 26 Williston on Con-
tracts § 68:5 (4th ed.). 
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The controversy over restitution claims between cohabitants is a controversy about the norms 
and expectations for cohabitating relationships.
176
 Courts relax two standard doctrines of restitu-
tion for cohabitants: retaining a gratuitously transferred benefit is not unjust and restitution is not 
a substitute for readily available contracts.
177
 The reporters’ comments in the Restatement argue 
that these rules should be relaxed, because cohabitants make transfers expecting their relation-
ship to continue and to share in the transferred benefits.
178
 This fact about expectations only be-
gins to answer the fundamental question: are these reasonable expectations that merit legal pro-
tection? What behavior should the law demand of cohabitants? Professor Dagan argues that resti-
tution should be used to facilitate relationships of trust, by ensuring that one party to an ongoing 
relationship does not unfairly take advantage of the other’s contributions.179 In response, Profes-
sor Sherwin argues that cohabitants can easily protect themselves with “off the rack” legal rela-
tions like loans or shared title, and cohabitants should be able to maintain relationships with less 
commitment.
180
 This debate between Dagan and Sherwin, on which the Restatement has taken a 
controversial position, is about what behavior is reasonable in cohabitation relationships. 
If the state abolishes relationship licenses, restitution law will replicate similar debates for all 
intimate litigants. Before a court can decide whether it is unjust for the defendant to retain bene-
fits from the relationship, the court must make judgments about the level and type of commit-
ment in the relationship. Consider Caleb and Dan again. The court must discern the couples’ be-
liefs about their roles in the relationship. Caleb increased the value of Dan’s house by building 
the porch, but perhaps Caleb often did the handy-man work while Dan performed domestic ser-
vices. Moreover, the nature of their relationship colors the nature of the transfer. Assume they 
have no prior division of labor. Caleb’s choice to build the porch appears in a different light if 
they were long-term, committed partners who shared everything, than if they had an off-and-on 
 
 
176
 Cp. Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract 
and Back Again? 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 55 (1978) with Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Eval-
uation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 891-94 (2005). Casad ar-
gues that neither cohabitant can be unjustly enriched when both “probably contemplated that the benefits 
they would receive—material and non-material—would offset the burdens they undertook” and “[n]either 
party anticipated paying for the material benefits received.” In response, Garrison argues that restitution is 
appropriate when a cohabitant “gains a significant, unearned benefit or suffers a significant, uncompen-
sated loss.” Garrison’s test appears relationship neutral, but judgments about what is “unearned” or “un-
compensated” rest on expectations about what cohabitants owe one another in the relationship. 
177
 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2 (2011) 
178
 Id. cmt. c.  
179
 Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Relationships, 92 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1034, 1038-43 (2012). 
180
 Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 711, 731-36 (2006).  
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again relationship in which Caleb frequently but unsuccessfully tried to get Dan to commit.  
Restitution law cannot avoid interpreting transfers by reference to the terms of the couples’ 
relationship and general norms regarding relationships of that type. Sherwin notes that the cohab-
itation section of the Restatement (Third) requires judges to engage in “particularistic” moral 
judgments about the relationships, rather than the Restatement’s general strategy to define rules 
for specific factual scenarios.
181
 She frames this as an objection, but it is inevitable. A court can-
not interpret a transfer between cohabitants without understanding their relationship. As I argued 
regarding IIED claims and implied contract terms, judgments about the nature of a relationship 
cannot be restricted to the couple’s express beliefs. Their beliefs are often indeterminate until 
applied using norms about appropriate behavior in this type of relationship.  
D. Why not Simply Refuse to Recognize Status? 
Could there be a more straightforward answer? Maybe private law could simply ignore inti-
mate relationships. This proposal seems consistent with the desire to abolish formal status cate-
gories. It also seems to avoid entangling the state in the details of intimate relationships.  
While initially attractive, the proposal is remarkably difficult even to formulate, because 
many causes of action require contextual judgments about appropriate intimate behavior. One 
might argue, as Ellman and Sugarman do for IIED claims, that we should prohibit these type of 
claims between intimate parties.
182
 This proposal, of course, is not relationship-blind. It creates a 
fundamental legal distinction based on affiliation. To identify plaintiffs barred from bringing 
IIED claims, the law must distinguishing intimacy from other relationships: friends, roommates, 
coworkers, personal assistants, etc. Moreover, while the proposal avoids imposing legal duties on 
intimates, it creates a unique legal privilege. Intimates are immune from ordinary legal duties, 
such as to avoid inflicting emotional harm or to fulfill implied promises.  
Instead, the proposal might be that intimates can bring these claims, but their intimate rela-
tionship cannot be considered when evaluating the alleged conduct. For example, spouses could 
bring IIED claims but judgments about the “outrageousness” of their conduct cannot depend on 
the couples’ marriage. This proposal does not obviate the need to categorize intimate affiliates. 
The fact-finder must now distinguish which expectations flow from the intimate relationship, 
rather than from other legally relevant relationships. Officials must ask a new counter-factual 
 
 
181
 Id. at 735. Sherwin is also concerned that contextual judgments leave too much freedom to ap-
ply the fact-finders values and lead to inconsistent results that distort litigation incentives.  
182
 See infra Part III.A.  
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question: would it have been outrageous for the parties to engage in similar conduct if they were 
not intimates? Assume a stereotypical fact pattern, in which a husband demeans his wife while 
they are in other’s company, locks her out of the house and denies her access to their checking 
account. Does it make sense to decide this case by asking whether such conduct would have been 
unreasonable between friends, housemates or economic partners? I doubt this question can lead 
to coherent judgments, but even if it could, they still involve distinctions based on intimacy. De-
liberate ignorance is often self-defeating in this fashion. To ignore isolated aspects of the world, 
you must be particularly attentive to precisely those aspects you want to ignore.  
Similar problems would arise in contract law. Officials might try to ignore intimate relation-
ships when judging whether one party exerted coercive pressure, whether they entered a long-
term relational contract, or whether their contract is unconscionable. The law might exempt inti-
mate affiliates from these rules or might isolate the legally pertinent features of their relationship 
from its intimate aspects. The first option seems to avoid imposing specific duties on intimates. 
Unfortunately, it does so by imposing one general disability: intimates contracts are limited to 
explicit terms. The law must define the category of “intimate relationships” that it subjects to this 
demanding default rule, which it does not impose on other contracting parties. The second option 
seeks quixotically to isolate intimate from non-intimate features of our relationships. This is the 
approach adopted by many states for cohabitation contracts.
183
 When a couple enters a premarital 
contract, their intention to share finances and cohabit would matter (presumably because these 
aspects can be shared by non-intimates), but not the reason for these choices that shapes their 
behavior and their expectations.  
Attempts to render private law blind to intimate relationships are self-defeating. The state 
would need to define categories of intimacy to decide which relationships or aspects of relation-
ships are exempt from ordinary law. And, contrary to the goal of neutrality, this general exemp-
tion continues to define the couple’s legal obligations based on their intimate status.  
* * * * 
This extended hypothetical has two lessons. The primary lesson is that abolishing formal sta-
tus categories does not abolish status-based regulation. Intimacy is one of many relationships that 
alter our rights in contract, tort and equity. If the state abolished formal status categories, private 
law would recreate status norms. Either courts would use common law methods to articulate de-
 
 
183
 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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fault rules or juries would use reasonableness tests to enforce conventional norms.
184
 A state 
could exempt intimates from these private law doctrines, but that would create a systemic status-
based distinction. Intimates would be subject to a pervasive legal disability, and the law would 
still have to define the types of relationships subject to this disability. In short, abolishing mar-
riage will not get the state out of the marriage business. 
The second lesson is that when parties seek to enforce rights tied closely to their intimate re-
lationship, the law oscillates between discerning the terms of their relationship and imposing 
normative judgments on the couple. This oscillation is most evident in IIED and unjust enrich-
ment claims, but it is present in contract law as well. The law can try to restrict its attention to a 
couple’s actual expectations, but their expectations are often indeterminate precisely where law 
demands answers. To enforce intimate rights, the law fills these gaps with status-based norms.  
This section has not explained why private law rules will inevitably relies on status or why 
legal enforcement oscillates between private and status norms. Nor does this section provide any 
argument for a legal status like marriage. However, the oscillation offers a clue to explaining 
why the state cannot avoid status norms, and this explanation is the next step in reconstructing a 
liberal justification for marital status.  
The state cannot avoid relying on intimate status norms, even in private law, because intimate 
relationships involve imperfect duties. A duty is imperfect when the agent has discretion to 
choose how and when to fulfill it, a discretion limited by subjective commitment to perform. The 
law struggles to handle imperfect duties. The only way to enforce intimate duties is to supplant 
the agent’s discretion to specify the content of the duty and replace the agent’s subjective com-
mitment with legal sanctions. As long as intimates have enforceable rights in their relationships, 
the law will oscillate between striving to enforcing the terms of relationships and imposing status 
norms on couples.
185
 This section defines imperfect duties in the marital context, explains their 
inherent indeterminacy and identifies the challenges that they pose for legal enforcement.  
Several more words of caution. The theory of marriage I rely on is deliberately shallow. I as-
sume marriage involves imperfect moral duties, but I do not develop a full theory of marriage. 
 
 
184
 Although these legal processes have apparent drawbacks, I am not arguing that status norms 
are less objectionable when defined by a legislature than by judges or juries.  
185
 The oscillation is exacerbated by incomplete commitment to either liberalism or communitari-
anism, as family law state struggles to decide when and whether it may legitimately impose teleological 
values on citizens. 
IV. IMPERFECT DUTIES AND STATUS NORMS 
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Marriage may be valuable because it is a relationship of love and mutual self-sacrifice,
186
 an 
economic partnership,
187
 a “liberal egalitarian community”,188 or a union of naturally comple-
mentary gender roles.
189
 Marital obligations may be grounded in promises, reliance, dependence 
or natural law. I hope to bypass these debates about the value or ground of marital norms, start-
ing instead with common assumptions about their content and structure. I rely only on the claim 
that marriage involves imperfect duties, a claim I substantiate only by appeal to widespread 
marital norms.
190
 My dry, structural account of marital duties needs to be embedded in a deeper 
theory to explain why marriage is valuable. Fortunately, marital duties are broadly imperfect on 
most of the above theories. My hope is that this argument can serve as a site of overlapping con-
sensus between more comprehensive theories of marriage.
191
 
The inclusiveness of any argument, of course, has limits. My argument begins with a cultur-
ally contingent conception of intimate relationships. There is a legitimate concern that the result-
ing theory applies only within a narrow cultural perspective. I can say little at the outset to allay 
such fears, except that I strive to point out the more controversial assumptions as I proceed. 
There is, however, one central limitation. The argument assumes intimate relationships are min-
imally reciprocal. Neither spouse should be subordinated to the other, such that spouses’ unilat-
eral choices can fully determine the content of the other’s duties. This premise rules out funda-
mentally hierarchal or patriarchal conceptions of marriage. I regard this as a reasonable limit, 
 
 
186
 Wardle, supra note 35, at 122.  
187
 Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1998). 
188
 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 43, at 81-94. 
189
 Don Browning, A Natural Law Theory of Marriage, ZYGON 46.3 (Aug. 2011).  
190
 Another question arises whether an account of imperfect duties must assume a moral theory. 
The perfect-imperfect distinction is often associated with deontological moral theory, but Mill and other 
consequentialists have developed accounts of imperfect duties broadly consistent with my discussion. See 
Mill, supra note 6, at 61; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You 
Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation), PHIL. ISS. 15, at 193-204 (2005) (arguing a duty is imperfect if 
better consequences result when agents to feel shameful rather than guilty for failing to perform enough 
of a type of acts); Douglas Portmore, Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options, NOUS 46:1, at 24-60 
(2012) (arguing many practical reasons are imperfect because they can be pursued in numerous equally 
rational ways over the course of one’s life). My emphasis on duties may conflict with a broader virtue or 
care ethics approach, but I suspect that any theory of right action in virtue ethics will bear striking similar-
ities to the two core features of imperfect duties, latitude and commitment.  
191
 John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 134-172 (1993) (Expanded Ed. 2005). One of Rawls’ in-
sights in Political Liberalism was that even divergent religious and moral perspectives may converge on 
intermediate premises for political decision-making. Because marriage law is part of the basic structure, 
political arguments about it should be subject to general constraints of public reason. John Rawls, The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, § 5, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED ED. 466-73 (2005).  
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since the project is to reconstruct a liberal justification for marriage law. 
A. The Content and Structure of Marital Obligations 
Any description of intimate moral norms is controversial, but I hope to draw on broad and 
commonly recognized ones. I focus primarily on marriage-like relationships, because investigat-
ing the structure of marital norms illuminates intimate norms more generally. If the norms for 
other intimate relationships lack these features, then the argument for state forbearance simply 
does not apply. That does not imply any judgment about the value of such relationships. 
The day-to-day life of marriage involves a tangle of overlapping moral norms. I suggest the 
following tentative examples: sexual fidelity, emotional fidelity, economic support (including 
financial and domestic services), emotional support and relationship maintenance. I harbor no 
pretenses that this list is exhaustive or that any member is necessary. Many marriages lack some 
of these norms, but anything we commonly recognize as a marriage has some of them. The list 
evidently contains various types of norms. It includes moral rights and duties between the spouse 
and toward third parties. Spouses also harbor expectations about one another’s behavior and feel-
ings. These expectations are less naturally described as “rights,” but they have a similar structure 
and involve similar moralized attitudes like guilt, shame and resentment. For instance, because 
spouses should care about one another, a person may feel resentful if her wife forgets her birth-
day and her wife should be contrite. Moralized attitudes of this sort often depend on ideals of vir-
tue, such as more or less implicit conceptions of the good spouse (boyfriend, friend or lover). 
Although these marital norms differ in many respects, most have two aspects that confound legal 
enforcement: (1) imperfect duties with (2) correlative claims.  
Most important, many marital norms are imperfect duties. Imperfect duties have two defining 
characteristics: substantial latitude in the required conduct and an intrinsic connection to subjec-
tive motivations. Several conceptions of the imperfect-perfect distinction exist, but most are 
driven by the shared intuition that some duties permit greater latitude in their performance.
192
 
Perfect duties leave little or no latitude. The duty not to murder or steal and the duty to pay a 
 
 
192
 Thomas Hill, Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation, KANT-STUDIEN LXXII, at 55-76 
(1971); George Rainbolt, Perfect and Imperfect Obligations, PHIL. STUD. 98, at 233-256 (2000). Not all 
accounts of imperfect duties make latitude their core feature. Mill argued that imperfect duties also lack 
correlative moral claims or claim holders, supra note 6, at  48-49, and some philosophers consider this a 
defining feature of imperfect duties. E.g. Onora O’Neill, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON 189-192, 224-232 
(1989). This categorization obscures important distinctions, because one can have duties to specific per-
sons without determinate content and free-floating duties with determinate content.  
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debt are perfect duties.
193
 Any time an act would qualify as murder, the agent is obligated not to 
do it. Imperfect duties, in contrast, leave agents with greater discretion. She has latitude to decide 
when, how or how often to fulfill her imperfect duties. Moreover, even if she recognizes an ap-
propriate chance to fulfill her imperfect duty, she may still choose not to fulfill it now, in this 
manner. Philosophers often regard charity as a paradigmatic imperfect duty. The wealthy should 
donate money sometimes but may forgo many opportunities. Each person may decide to whom, 
when and how much to donate. Moreover, even if a well-off person recognizes that a certain 
cause is worthy of charity, she may choose not to donate, as long as similarly opportunities are 
likely to arise in the future.
194
 
Following George Rainbolt, I assumes that the imperfect-perfect distinction is one of degree. 
All duties admit more or less latitude, and this latitude may vary across multiple dimensions of 
the required conduct. Rainbolt identifies five non-exhaustive dimensions: time, place, manner, 
object or person, and number of required acts. Even perfect duties admit some discretion on 
some dimensions. A debtor may be required to pay a particular amount to a particular person by 
a particular date, yet still retain discretion to choose whether to pay early or on the due date, in a 
lump sum or in installments. Likewise, no imperfect duties are fully indeterminate. While I have 
substantial discretion to decide how much money to donate and which charities to support, I fail 
my obligation if I donate only a pittance or donate only to worthless causes. Imperfect duties 
have minimal thresholds. Moreover, even a widely imperfect duty may require specific action in 
particular factual contexts. For instance, a parent’s duty to support his child’s development is 
imperfect, but if he has not attended any his daughter’s sporting events this year, then he is obli-
gated to attend her final soccer match.
195
  
 
 
193
 As these examples show, the imperfect-perfect distinction is orthogonal to the more familiar 
positive-negative distinction. Perfect duties often require forbearance, such as refraining from theft, but 
some also require positive action, such paying a debt. Imperfect duties are often positive, such as the duty 
of beneficence, but may be negative, such as the duty not to harm the environment. 
194
 Imperfect duties need not be less stringent than perfect duties. Some have argued that perfect 
duties always trump imperfect ones, because a perfect duty will require specific action while an imperfect 
duties will permit action on some other occasion, Susan Hale, Against Supererogation, AM. PHIL. Q. 
28(4), 276 (1991), but such arguments conflate precision with stringency. Another intuition associated 
with imperfect obligations is that one can go “above and beyond” their requirements, so they are some-
times invoked to explain supererogatory actions. Marcia Baron, Imperfect Duties and Supererogatory 
Acts, ANN. REV. L. & ETHICS 6, 57-71 (1998) (arguing against this conflation).  
195
 Most imperfect duties involve vague act-types, but imperfect duties should not be reduced to 
vagueness. An act-type is vague if it has some clear instances and non-instances but also borderline cases 
in which there is no answer whether an act-token falls under the type. The borderline admits of discretion, 
in the specific sense that the choice is unguided by whatever features characterize the type.  
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Most marital duties are imperfect. The marital duty with the least latitude is likely sexual fi-
delity. Assuming spouses have this duty, they are obligated not to engage in (or pursue) any sex-
ual acts with any third party. The category of “sexual acts” may be vague, but one could argue 
that spouses should avoid even borderline sexual acts. Unlike sexual fidelity, most marital rights 
and duties offer significant latitude. Spouses have a duty of economic support, but they must 
choose what quality of life to maintain, what kind of services to provide one another and how 
integrated they want their economic life to become. The duty of emotional support offers more 
latitude. Spouse may expect one another to perform some caring acts, but spouses must find 
ways to support one another and judge when such support is appropriate. The duty to contribute 
to the relationship permits even more latitude, including discretion to decide which activities to 
share, how many and how often.  
Despite the latitude of marital norms, they often involve corresponding claims and claim-
holders. A martial duty of support is owed specifically to one’s spouse.196 When Caleb’s father’s 
dies, only Caleb is entitled to expect, request or demand support. A third-party can remind Dan 
of his duty to Caleb, and he may judge Dan’s character poorly if he fails to fulfill it, but the third-
party has no ability to demand Dan fulfill his duties. In fact, many marital duties have correlative 
“claim rights” in strict the Hohfeldian sense.197 A has a claim right against B that B perform 
some act if and only if B has a duty to A to perform that act.
198
 Consider, for example, a spouse’s 
right to economic support. Amy has a right against Beth that Beth provide economic support, 
which means Beth has a duty to Amy to provide support her. Not all duties have corresponding 
claim rights in this fashion. Often, no one has a right to demand that we fulfill our duties. Many 
imperfect duties lack correlative claim-holders. I have an imperfect duty to give to charity, but 
no specific charity can demand that I donate to it. Imperfect martial duties, however, cannot 
plausibly be understood in this fashion. Amy owes her duty of support to Beth, and Beth has a 
 
 
196
 It is an open question whether spouses might also have a duty to the state to fulfill marital du-
ties, a question I do not intend to prejudge here.  
197
 George W. Rainbolt, THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS 25-29 (2006) (describing consensus contempo-
rary definition of Hohfeldian claim rights). Spouses also have “privileges” and “powers” with respect to 
one another. A has a privilege to do some act if B has no right that A not do it. For instance, Caleb has a 
privilege to open Dan’s closet if and only if Dan has no right that Caleb not open the closet. Spouses also 
receive certain “powers” to alter one another’s rights and duties. Caleb can accept a dinner invitation for 
the couple, which means that Dan now has a duty to attend. 
198
 This definition assumes that omission is a way of performing some act. Intimate rights may be 
a right that one’s spouse perform an action, or not, and one right might include both components. A right 
to fidelity, for example, might include a right that one’s partner not enter other romantic entanglements 
and a right that he cultivate this romantic attachment.  
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correlative claim to Amy’s support.  
Our imperfect martial duties involve correlative moral claims with claim-holders, yet latitude 
in the duties translates into slack in the claims. When the subject of an imperfect duty has discre-
tion to decide how, when or how often to perform, the correlative claim-holder can have no right 
to demand a specific kind, time or amount of performance. For example, one has an imperfect 
duty to support one’s spouse economically, and one’s spouse has a correlative right to economic 
support. However, if one spouse has no duty to provide a particular kind or amount of support, 
then the other cannot have a right to demand a specific kind or amount of support. Moreover, 
even if some occasion presents a reasonable opportunity for fulfill one’s imperfect duty, the 
agent may often maintain in good faith that she planned to fulfill the duty on another occasion or 
in another manner. As long as other similar opportunities are likely to arise in the future, the 
agent may decide not to perform the duty now in light of other values.
199
 For example, even if 
Amy believes that attending her wife Beth’s family reunion would be an appropriate way to sup-
port her, Amy may skip the reunion to fulfill work obligations, as long as she plans to attend 
family holidays. Beth may be disappointed, but she has no right to demand that Amy attend the 
reunion, as long as both Amy and Beth recognize that Amy remains committed to the relation-
ship. Because many marital duties are imperfect, spouses have substantial discretion to specify 
the precise content of their marital duties and rights.  
This example of Amy and Beth also illustrates the second major feature of imperfect duties. 
Imperfect duties are tightly connected to subjective moral motivations. Doing enough in the right 
way is part of maintaining subjective commitment. For example, parents have a duty to support 
their children’s development. Parents need not adopt a single-minded focus on their children’s’ 
activities, but a father who never attends his son’s recitals violates that duty. In addition, his con-
duct reveals his commitments. The father could fail similarly by attending but then never putting 
down his smart phone. While he may deeply desire or wish for his son to do well, he has not 
committed to supporting his son’s musical development. Accordingly, we should add a second 
aspect to our definition of imperfect obligations. The agent has a duty to maintain a subjective 
commitment, which the agent manifests by performing sufficient acts of the relevant type in an 
appropriate manner.  
In the marital context, subjective commitment to the marriage requires spouses to act to ful-
 
 
199
 Philosophers disagree about whether one may forgo an opportunity to perform imperfect du-
ties only to fulfill other competing duties, or whether one may forgo the opportunity simply to pursue 
other inclinations. See Thomas Hill, Meeting Needs and Doing Favors, HUMAN WELFARE AND HUMAN 
WORTH 220-22 (2002). 
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fill their duties on a sufficiently frequent basis in the right way. Although a spouse may choose 
not to perform some actions that could fulfill his imperfect marital duties, if he does not do 
enough and do them with the right attitude, then he is not truly committed. This is a frequent 
trope of romantic comedies. A workaholic frequently cancels date-night with his wife, but she 
forgives him because she understands how much he values his work. Yet, her patience finally 
snaps when he spends an entire date on his phone. The hapless husband thinks she is overreact-
ing, but in fact, she has concluded that he is no longer committed to their marriage. Even if he 
loves her and wants to remain married, he has not made their marriage a guiding end in his life. 
Performing enough of one’s duties in the right way is tightly connected to, maybe even constitu-
tive of, subjective commitment. By exercising their discretion to judge how and when to fulfill 
their imperfect duties, intimates define their vision of the relationship and demonstrate their 
commitment to it. Spouses need discretion to act in ways that express their commitment, and 
their commitment is what constrains the latitude in their conduct.  
This notion of subjective commitment is, admittedly, uninspiring. Unfortunately, greater 
elaboration would mires us in controversy about the nature of commitment for imperfect duties 
in general and for imperfect marital duties in particular. Kant’s theory of imperfect duties is un-
doubtedly the most influential. He explains the commitment underlying all imperfect duties as 
adopting an end. The categorical imperative requires all rational agents to adopt certain ends, in 
particular self-development and others’ happiness.200 A duty is perfect if a proposed action is in-
consistent with adopting a required end, imperfect if adopting ends require some action without 
determining precisely how or to what extent one must act.
201
 Imperfect duties leave agents “play-
room … for free choice ” about how to fulfill the end.202 Extending this account to marriage (alt-
hough Kant did not), one might argue that marriage involves each spouse adopting the other’s 
ends. Whether an action (relevant to the marriage) is morally worthy depends on whether it is 
consistent or inconsistent with adopting one’s spouses’ ends as one’s own.203 Because it is usual-
ly possible to facilitate a person’s well-being in numerous ways, marital duties will rarely gener-
 
 
200
 Immanuel Kant, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AK 6:384-88, in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY 516-18 (Mary Gregor trans. & ed. 1996).  
201
 Id. at 6:390-91 (521-22). See also Hill, supra note 199, at 206 (explaining that to adopt an end 
means to make it “a serious, major, continually relevant, life-shaping end”). 
202
 Id. at AK 6:390 (521).  
203
 Kant regards marriage as primarily a legal contract to use one another’s body, because he ar-
gues that a mutual exchange is the only way to use rightfully a person’s body (another’s or one’s own). 
Id. at AK 6:277-280 (426-429). The Kantian theory that I sketch, in contrast, makes marriage look more 
like a special case of beneficence. Id. at AK 6:469-73 (584-88). 
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ate strict rules of conduct.  
Most of us crave a more romantic account of the subjective commitment underlying imper-
fect duties. We expect romantic love from our spouses.
 
The love-based conception of marriage, 
despite its recent vintage in Western life, is now pervasive.
204
 Spouses expect one another to act 
in ways that manifest affection. This expectation can affect judgments about imperfect duties. It 
is not sufficient to simply throw a party for your spouses’ birthday; the day needs to have espe-
cially personal or romantic moments. Despite its prominence as an ideal, romantic love is not 
necessary for intimate relationships. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine long-term, personal rela-
tionships without pervasive emotional attachments. A full theory of marriage must explain how 
adopting ends, love and care relate to moral duties in adult, intimate relationships. My argument, 
however, will rely only on the more limited notion of subjective commitment described above. 
This minimal account is consistent with a broad range of moral visions for marriage. Recogniz-
ing that this assumption is controversial, I regard the adoption of ends, love and care as special-
ized versions of or supplements to this minimal sense of commitment.  
This section has offered a skeletal account of moral rights and duties in marriage-like rela-
tionships. Marriage creates imperfect marital duties and rights, yet these duties and rights leave 
spouses substantial latitude in performance. This latitude is constrained by the requirement that 
spouses maintain appropriate subjective commitments.  
B. Legal Enforcement of Imperfect Obligations in Ongoing Relationships 
Imperfect duties are a chronic hassle for legal enforcement. Because agents have discretion to 
determine the content of their duties, the law struggles to define rules and identify violations. 
Moreover, the state’s coercive mechanisms conflict with the subjective commitment that justifies 
and limits the agent’s discretion. These difficulties have led preeminent philosophers, including 
Kant and Mill, to conclude that imperfect duties are not legally enforceable.
205
 This part explores 
the difficulties created by efforts to enforce imperfect obligations. These difficulties are particu-
larly salient when considering enforcement in ongoing relationships.  
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 See Stephanie Cootz, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005) 
(describing social, economic and legal conditions that allowed love-based marriage to evolve and come to 
dominate between late eighteenth and twentieth centuries). 
205
 Kant, supra note 6; Mill, supra note 6.  
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3. Discretion and the specification of duties 
The latitude in imperfect obligations causes the first, and most serious, problem for legal en-
forcement of martial obligations. Because spouses have wide discretion in imperfect duties, it is 
often impossible, in principle, for a third party to specify their content. Spouses can fulfill their 
duties in different ways on different occasions. Even if a spouse recognizes that this occasion is 
an appropriate chance to fulfill her duty, she may choose to forgo performance, as long as other 
opportunities will arise. When an act or omission falls in this zone of discretion, a third-party 
simply cannot determine whether the act or omission fulfilled the agent’s imperfect duty. 
On the other hand, third parties may be able to identify blatant violations. Imperfect duties 
have a lower threshold. Sometimes, anyone who can reasonably claim to be committed to per-
forming a duty must avoid or perform certain actions. One way to clearly violate an imperfect 
duty is not failing to act over a significant amount of time. For example, no one could claim to be 
committed to supporting his husband’s career while never attending any of his husband’s work 
events. Moreover, even a single act or omission, in the right circumstances, can clearly violate an 
imperfect duty. For instance, no one can be committed to supporting their spouse financially 
without trying to help meet the spouse’s basic needs.206  
Absent conduct outside the realm of acceptable latitude, however, it is impossible for a third 
party to judge whether specific acts or omissions violate imperfect marital duties. Consider Caleb 
and Dan again. Dan wants to buy a new house but Caleb wants to invest the money for retire-
ment. Dan files a lawsuit claiming that Caleb’s refusal to buy the new home violates his duty of 
financial support. A new home, Dan argues, would be more consistent with their standard of liv-
ing. A third party cannot, in principle, resolve this dispute. The problem is not epistemic. The 
problem is not that a third party would have difficulty identifying the couples’ agreement is dis-
cerning whether a new home is appropriate for their standard of living. The problem is that Caleb 
and Dan have discretion to choose how to fulfill their support obligations, in light of their desired 
standard of living and allocation of resources. Ideally, Caleb and Dan would decide jointly. But 
until they make that decision, there is no precise answer about what level of support Caleb must 
provide. If, in contrast, Caleb had refused to help Dan buy basic groceries, then one can reasona-
 
 
206
 The dispute between the court in McGuire v. McGuire and its critics is, at least in part, about 
the limits of this vague threshold. The court did not want to adjudicate disputes about whether a decent 
standard of living included indoor plumbing, while its critics are comfortable assuming the husband fell 
below the minimal level of support. See supra note 26. Other courts have specified the minimal threshold 
as a standard of neglect. See supra note 27.  
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bly conclude that Caleb is not committed to fulfilling his support obligations.  
A state could press the point and try to enforce imperfect duties in this zone of discretion. To 
specify their precise content, a conscientious official might ask what decision the couple would 
have made if they were not disagreeing. Unfortunately, this counterfactual judgment has no clear 
answer. The official might use the couple’s past practices to project their future decisions. How-
ever, they made those past decisions assuming that they would have future opportunities to rein-
terpret the relationship and adjust its terms. Their past arrangements do not govern the present 
dispute. The imagined hypothetical cannot simply reconstruct the couple’s decision. It involves 
judgments about the best shape for the couple’s ongoing relationship, which must rely on exter-
nal standards: the official’s values, community standards, or a hypothetical rational couple.  
The discretion in imperfect intimate duties explains why the law cannot avoid status and why 
legal judgments vacillate between contextual decisions and status norms. To adjudicate intimate 
disputes, a fact-finder must settle the couple’s disagreements about their imperfect duties. These 
legal decisions inevitably require judgments about how couples ought to live. At best, the law 
can judge the parties’ relationships in light of their past conduct and general norms for that type 
of relationship. Not incidentally, this is what the couple does for the themselves when consider-
ing their intimate duties.  
4. Coercion and the adoption of ends  
The second problem with enforcing marital duties relates to the connection between imper-
fect duties and subjective commitments. Imperfect duties require agents to act on certain subjec-
tive commitments, whether adopting a particular end or acting out of love. These commitments 
determine whether a discretionary act fulfills the imperfect duty. Because it is impossible to 
force a person to maintain subjective commitment, it is impossible to coerce someone to fulfill 
an imperfect duty. At best, coercion can force the person to complete acts consistent with the im-
perfect duty.  
This difficulty is a variant of a familiar problem: virtue cannot be coerced. Legal coercion is 
a blunt instrument. The possibility of legal sanctions for performing or not certain acts alters in-
dividuals’ motivational sets. The law can create new incentives to act one way or another but 
cannot force a person to act for a particular reason or on a particular motive. Only deeply intru-
sive types of coercion – such as medicinal interventions – can force a person to act on a particu-
lar motive. Of course, this problem applies to perfect moral duties as well, assuming that full 
compliance with even perfect moral duties may require acting on appropriate moral motivations. 
The conflict with enforcement of imperfect duties is distinctive, however, because the subjective 
commitment is essential to determining whether the external conduct satisfies the duty.  
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For a similar reason, litigation is inimical to imperfect obligations. If acting on the right sort 
of commitments is constitutive (at least in part) of fulfilling marital duties, then it is difficult to 
sue while also asserting that the relationship still exists. Marital litigation is both conceptually 
and psychologically difficult, but only the conceptual difficulty is really significant.  
Take the conceptual problems first. To claim that a spouse violated his marital duties, it is not 
sufficient for the plaintiff to assert that the defendant failed to fulfill his marital obligations on a 
few occasions or to fulfill them in the manner plaintiff expected. Such choices are within the lati-
tude of imperfect duties. To file a valid suit, the plaintiff must assert that the defendant failed to 
meet even the minimal thresholds of a marital duty. The law can police these minimal thresholds, 
assuming it is possible to identify some acts that are necessary to qualify as committed at all. 
However, the plaintiff’s assertion that his husband fell below this minimal threshold entails that 
his husband is not subjectively committed to the relationship. To bring a valid claim to enforce 
marital duties during a marriage, a plaintiff spouse must simultaneously asserts that his spouse 
has abandoned the marriage. Moreover, the lawsuit assumes his spouse will not fulfill his marital 
obligations without coercion. If legal sanctions are necessary to induce the defendant to perform 
his marital duties, then even if he complies with the legal judgment, he is not acting for the right 
reasons or with the right motives and, hence, not fulfilling his imperfect duties. The plaintiff 
spouse seeks to deprive the defendant of the discretion necessary to exercise his commitment. A 
person who performs services ordered by an authority out of concern for sanctions is, at best, a 
servant or employee. Not only is the plaintiff spouse asserting that the defendant is no longer 
committed to the marriage, the plaintiff is seeking to create a relationship in which the defendant 
spouse cannot participate in the marriage.
 207
  
Litigation also creates psychological tension. As other writes have noted, litigation encour-
ages an adversarial posture that conflicts with the motives for affection and cooperation in inti-
mate relationships. The tension is real but is not a fundamental problem. It may not apply to par-
ticular couples and specific disputes. Moreover, as Mary Ann Case has argued, couples often use 
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 Non-legal enforcement mechanisms can, but need not, involve a similar conceptual tension. 
Self-help and social sanctions work best when both spouses are committed to the relationship and care 
about one another’s feelings. A guilt-trip is most effective when the other person cares about your feel-
ings. However, non-legal enforcement can cross the same line as legal enforcement. Even if Caleb no 
longer cares about his husband Dan, Caleb may refrain from marital misbehavior simply because Dan’s 
guilt trips are annoying or because Caleb would be ashamed in front of his friends. If a spouse realizes 
that he must rely on self-help or social sanctions in this way, he faces the same dilemma as a legal plain-
tiff.  
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psychologists or religious counselors to negotiate disputes.
208
 The psychological tension created 
by litigation not qualitatively different than the tension from non-legal enforcement. In addition, 
although our legal system is adversarial, that is not a necessary feature of legal interventions. Al-
ternative dispute resolution mechanisms might reduce the conflicting incentives of the adversari-
al process.  
5. Vagueness in imperfect duties 
These first two problems exacerbate a third, practical problem. Many intimate duties are irre-
ducibly vague – that is, they involve concepts with indeterminate borderline cases.209 For in-
stance, spouses should help clean their shared house, but assistance comes in degrees, and there 
is no precise threshold for distinguishing sufficient from insufficient assistance. Ordinarily, 
vagueness is not a serious challenge for law. Many legal duties are vague, and the law has stand-
ard strategies to construe vague duties. Unfortunately, these standard legal methods are ill-suited 
for imperfect intimate obligations, because of the two conceptual problems described above.  
The law sometimes resolves vague duties using reasonableness tests. For instance, in a com-
mercial requirements contract, a purchaser has a right to buy any number of units it needs for 
each installment, as long as the order is not “unreasonably disproportionate” to a prior estimate 
or normal prior amounts.
210
 If the parties litigate this issue, the fact-finder must judge whether 
the request was reasonable in light of the parties’ past practice and commercial standards in the 
relevant community.
211
 Such reasonableness tests give a third-party fact-finder authority to make 
judgments in the vague boundaries. The state could use similar reasonableness tests to resolve 
vague marital duties. For example, a fact-finder might specify how much support each spouse 
must provide by asking what standard of living is reasonable for this couple, based on either the 
fact-finders judgment or on community standards for similar couples. Of course, this procedure 
runs into the first problem described above. It requires a third party to make the discretionary 
judgments about imperfect duties that spouses entrust to one another. Having the power to make 
such discretionary decisions is part of being in that relationship. 
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 Case, supra note 28, 250-255. 
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 The indeterminacy created by vagueness is distinct from the discretion of imperfect duties. All 
imperfect duties must involve general act-types, but these types need not be vague. An agent may have 
discretion to determine which of act-tokens of the non-vague type to pursue. 
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 UCC § 2-306(1).  
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 Thomas Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 585, 590-60 (1995-1996).  
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A second legal method swings to extreme deference. Sometimes the law ignores the content 
of an agent’s decision, unless there were flaws in the decision-making process. For example, 
courts will not review business judgments by corporate directors unless the directors lacked any 
relevant information or had a conflict of interest.
212
 A similar rule is not promising for marriage. 
Marriage lacks any natural decision-procedures and only an implausibly strong duty of loyalty 
would require spouses to put marriage before all other loyalties. In marginal cases, questions 
about a duty of loyalty would replicate the substantive question. Does a spouse violate her duty 
of loyalty if she decides to forgo a lavish vacation to support her adult child, friend, or charity?
213
  
For still other vague duties, the law limits judicial review to non-vague cases. This result can 
be achieved by codifying the minimal requirements or by lowering the standard of review. For 
example, child protection agencies will intervene to enforce a child’s rights to adequate care 
when her parents deny her life-saving blood transfusion but not when they refuse potentially life-
saving vaccines. The law might treat vague intimate obligations similarly – in fact, this is the ap-
proach adopted by states that enforce a duty of support to prevent “neglect.”214 Unfortunately, 
this approach runs headlong into the second conceptual problem described above. When child 
protection agencies intervene to protect children from neglect, they typically terminate the rela-
tionship.
215
 In contrast, a spousal suit to enforce rights inter se assumes the relationship should 
persist. It is somewhat perverse to create a cause of action during relationships while limiting it 
to contexts in which the relationship is substantively over.  
Last, the law might enforce imperfect marital obligations only insofar as spouses formalize 
them in express or written agreements. This compromise was adopted by the Uniform Premarital 
and Marital Agreements Act, but it has several flaws.
216
 First, explicit agreements are not neces-
sarily less vague. Spouses might even agree explicitly to the standard package of vague marital 
duties. Instead, the proposal must be to enforce only express agreements relating to non-vague 
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 Stephen Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
83, 88-89, (2004) (arguing the business judgment rule is a second-order rule against judicial review ab-
sent bad faith or procedural errors, rather than a liability rule that lowers the standard of care or an eviden-
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duties. Rather than a duty of domestic support, for instance, the spouses might agree to a precise 
division of domestic labor. This proposal is more workable but still flawed. Most important, it 
mischaracterizes intimate duties. Under this proposal, intimates can have enforceable obligations 
only if they transform their imperfect duties into perfect ones. Presumably, they do that by 
agreement. The only obligations the law will enforce are explicit promissory obligations, even if 
intimate duties have another moral basis, such as reliance, status or love. In addition, this pro-
posal can result in unfairness. It enforces only intimate obligations capable of and likely to be the 
subject of express agreements. Spouses often make agreements about division of property but 
ignore questions created by the division of domestic and wage labor. Why enforce certain as-
pects and leave others floating in the wind?  
* * * * 
In Section II, I argued that abolishing intimate status would not prevent the state from catego-
rizing relationships and imposing status norms on couples. In this section, I have argued that the 
law cannot eliminate intimate status because intimate relationships involve imperfect duties. Im-
perfect marital duties require spouses to perform some acts but leaves discretion to determine 
when and how to act, cabined by a subjective commitment. These imperfect marital duties con-
found legal enforcement. Legal enforcement requires determinate judgments, which means a 
state official must supplant the couple’s discretion to specify their precise duties using contextual 
normative judgments. Moreover, legal enforcement substitutes coercive sanctions for the subjec-
tive commitment that underlies their imperfect marital duties.  
Some philosophers have argued that these conflicts entail that imperfect duties cannot be le-
gally enforceable. That is an overstatement. Intimate rights could be enforced in private law, but 
such direct legal enforcement requires giving officials authority that conflicts with defining fea-
tures of ongoing relationships. Marital status, in contrast, provides a more flexible way to create 
enforceable imperfect duties.  
Intimate relationships involve imperfect rights that deserve legal protection, yet these rights 
cannot be enforced without imposing status norms on couples. Marital status offers a way to 
manage this tension. The law’s refusal to enforce marital rights during marriage avoids displac-
ing the spouses’ discretion and commitment, while its egalitarian and equitable divorce remedies 
protect marital rights in ways consistent with their imperfect nature. These two aspects of marital 
status combine to create a legal framework for imperfect legal rights. Marital status allows 
spouses to maintain indeterminate legal duties without losing legal protections. 
V. MARITAL STATUS AS A FORM OF IMPERFECT LEGAL RIGHTS  
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The core of this argument, and a central contribution of this Article, is a limited defense of 
the intact marriage rule–the rule that spouses cannot sue to enforce marital rights until they sepa-
rate.
 217
 Tort, contract and equity have no analogous rules. The default rule in private law is that 
individuals can sue to vindicate their legal rights without repudiating the underlying legal rela-
tionship.
218
 Some would welcome a similar rule in marriage, and there is ample reason for skep-
ticism about the intact marriage rule. Nevertheless, I argue that the intact marriage rule is reason-
able, as long as it is combined with egalitarian dissolution rules.  
Accordingly, Section A clears away some underbrush, explaining and rejecting traditional 
justifications for the intact marriage rule. Section B argues that a combination of the intact mar-
riage rule and egalitarian dissolution rules provides a way to accommodate imperfect duties, 
while protecting the interests of the parties that enter these relationships. I am not arguing that 
marriage is a state-free space. As I argued above, the state cannot avoid relying on status norms, 
so the question is when and how to do so. The state’s decision to defer legal enforcement creates 
the space for autonomy during marriage. When the law recognizes this spousal authority, equita-
ble and egalitarian default remedies are appropriate. To be clear, my aim is not to defend mar-
riage law in all its facets. The goal is to identify an implicit rationale behind existing law, with 
the understanding that its full articulation may require substantial revisions of law. In particular, I 
suspect that divorce law undervalues gendered contributions to marriage and, to the extent these 
divorce remedies are not egalitarian, they should be reformed.  
C. Historical Justification for the Intact Marriage Rule  
The history of the intact marriage rule offers ample reasons to be wary. The intact marriage 
rule developed in the coverture regime. Coverture’s patriarchal norms supplied its first rationali-
zation: a married woman’s legal personality was subsumed into that of her husband, so allowing 
her to sue him would be like allowing him to sue himself.
219
 Similar doctrines were used to ra-
tionalize the civil and criminal spousal immunity that gave husbands legal permission to use their 
wives’ bodies.220 Even into the late twentieth century, the law continued to protect domestic 
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ners, but the Revised Uniform Partnership Act eliminated this rule. Rev. Uniform Partnership Act § 405 
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 Tobias, supra note 25, at 364-65. 
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Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).  
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abusers with privacy doctrines
221
 and spousal rapists with an assumption that consent to marriage 
was a blanket consent to sex.
222
 The process took far too long, but the law has largely eliminated 
the fiction of legal unity and most of its remnants, including spousal immunity. These formal 
changes do not ensure protection, but they are a start. They also have significant expressive 
meaning. A spouses’ right to bodily integrity is as strong with respect to her spouse as to 
strangers. Any contact with another person’s body without their consent is a battery, and mar-
riage no longer serves as a blanket proxy for actual consent. Moreover, this right can be enforced 
during relationships. A person can sue his or her spouse for battery or negligence committed dur-
ing the marriage and can even sue without a legal separation.  
In light of these changes, one might have expected the intact marriage rule to dissolve as 
well. Yet, it persevered. Its official rationale shifted. Contemporary courts argue that the intact 
marriage rule protects marital privacy.
223
 Privacy is a deeply ambiguous concept in legal dis-
course, but none of the senses of marital privacy convincingly support the intact marriage rule.
224
  
Privacy often refers to spatial or informational privacy.
225
 A couple enjoys marital privacy in 
this sense if they have a physical space secluded from intrusion or if information about their mar-
ital life is shielded from disclosure. However, the intact marriage rule does little to protect physi-
cal spaces, such as the marital home. Marital rights are unenforceable during the relationship re-
gardless of where those rights are pertinent – the home, market or workplace. This confusion be-
tween enforceability and spatial privacy is facilitated by the rule that marital duties are enforcea-
ble after spouses’ “separate.” However, separation here is a spatial metaphor. Spouses can live in 
the same residence while being separated or in different countries without being separated. What 
matters is when they stop being a couple, which is a normative relation.  
The intact marriage rule also does little to shield information about spouses’ lives from pub-
lic disclosure. One might argue that lawsuits require spouses to reveal sensitive information 
about their relationship, and if inter se claims were common, then spouses might be discouraged 
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from sharing freely. However, the intact marriage rule offers only modest protection for private 
information. A spouse may bring the same claim after separation, and this lawsuit will involve as 
much if not more disclosure. Moreover, an unhappy spouse may air the couples’ secrets during 
their marriage and, because of the intact marriage rule, will often remain immune from liability 
until they separate.  
Privacy, particularly in American law, has an additional meaning because of the Due Process 
right to privacy. When the Supreme Court held in Griswold that the Constitution protected mar-
ried couples’ right to access contraception, the majority latched onto the idea that laws banning 
contraception threatened to invade the marital bedroom and disclose information about marital 
sex lives.
226
 While concern for spatial and informational privacy influenced the Court, the Due 
Process “right to privacy” is now recognized as a misnamed liberty right against government in-
terference with specified actions.
227
 The intact marriage rule might be thought to protect “marital 
privacy,” in this sense of decisional autonomy.  
Non-interference offers a more promising start, but here one must be careful. The constitu-
tional right to privacy protects individuals from unwanted governmental interference. In litiga-
tion between spouses, governmental interference is not a significant concern. The plaintiff is ask-
ing the court to intervene. The spouses have reached an impasse, and at least one of them wants 
the court to define and enforce their duties. It is no response at all for a court to say that the gov-
ernment should not interfere out of respect for their marriage. The spouses disagree about their 
respective marital rights. Refusing to clarify and protect these rights does not demonstrate re-
spect for their marriage – indeed, the plaintiff is likely to conclude that the court is not taking her 
marital rights seriously.  
Nevertheless, the intact marriage rule could be a policy designed to reduce the government’s 
role in ongoing marriages more generally. On this theory, the state refuses to enforce marital 
rights in order to facilitate a specific conception of relationships, either one that the state prefers 
or one it assumes that couples prefer. The intact marriage rule facilitates a conception of relation-
ships within which it is preferable for spouses to interpret and enforce their marital rights. Either 
spouses compromise or separate. The intact marriage rule is not about immunity or privacy or 
respect for the individual litigant’s marriage – it is about the state’s refusal to intervene to settle 
and enforce ongoing spousal obligations. But why would couples prefer not to have enforceable 
rights and duties during the marriage?  
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Law and economics scholars have argued that the intact marriage rule is an efficient majori-
tarian default rule. Two hypothetically rational spouses would select a rule against legal en-
forcement of marital rights, because judges would do a poor job of discerning couples’ highly 
contextual marital arrangements, making legal sanctions less efficient than internalized norms, 
self-help and social sanctions.
228
 Feminist scholars have responded that requiring spouses to rely 
on self-help or social enforcement empowers husbands to fill the vacuum of state power with 
physical, economic and social power.
229
 I address this debate in Section D, but I think the effi-
ciency debate  misses the more pervasive challenge to legal enforcement posed by imperfect 
marital duties.  
D. Enforcement of Marital Obligations at Separation and Divorce 
The intact marriage rule is part of a sensible legal approach to imperfect marital duties. As I 
argued in Section III, direct enforcement of marital rights conflicts with spouses’ discretion to 
decide how and when to fulfill their imperfect marital duties and with the subjective commitment 
that cabins this discretion. These conflicts are especially prominent for claims brought during 
marriage. The intact marriage rule, by refusing to settle spouses’ disagreements about their mari-
tal rights, avoids displacing their discretion and commitment during the marriage. However, such 
state abstention is only one part of a scheme for imperfect rights. The law replaces ongoing en-
forcement with protection of marital rights at divorce. When spouses’ separate, they abandon 
their commitment and its accompanying discretion. The law may use egalitarian defaults to fill in 
the gaps in their expectations, subject to equitable discretion that tailors rules when the parties 
arrangements are clear. This basic structure of marital status – deferred protection and egalitarian 
dissolution – enables spouses to maintain legal relationships defined by imperfect duties. 
The problems for enforcement of marital rights in ongoing relationships were laid out in de-
tail in Section III. The remaining question is how can legal protection after separation avoid 
these problems.
230
 Justifying marital status requires answering two questions. Why does separa-
tion mark a categorical divide for legal protection, and why are equitable or egalitarian divorce 
remedies appropriate although they still impose norms on couples? 
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1. Why separation marks a categorical divide 
One possible explanation of the categorical divide is that intimate obligations are conditioned 
on the existence of the relationship. Intimates owe one another relational duties only while the 
relationship continues. To fully pursue this argument, one would need a full theory of marriage 
to explain why some but not all marital duties are conditional. Separation extinguishes the duty 
of fidelity and domestic support and weakens the duty of emotional support, but separation trig-
gers the duty of financial support. In addition, the full theory would need to explain how these 
conditional marital duties interact with unconditional ones. For instance, a theory that conceives 
of marriage primarily as an exchange of wage labor for domestic labor must explain why the 
former, but not the latter, is enforceable after the marriage.  
A more plausible justification is that the state abstains during marriage to respect the parties’ 
imperfect duties, but their separation undercuts the two conceptual problems with enforcing im-
perfect duties. First, once spouses separate, the state need not worry about usurping their power 
to define their relationship. The couple no longer entrust one another with latitude in specifying 
their imperfect duties. The actions they have taken in the past to fulfill their imperfect obligations 
are set. They no longer have privileged authority to interpret their past conduct or relate it to their 
future performance. After their separation, if the parties disagree about their marital obligations, 
the state cannot defer to either spouses’ understanding. For example, because a separated couple 
has abandoned their project of shared finances, neither spouse can claim authority to decide how 
to allocate the duty of financial support between their current and future needs. Of course, a di-
vorce court must still interpret their financial obligations. The interesting question, which I tackle 
below, is how a state should decides which norms to use.  
Second, after a couple separates, the state need not worry about interfering with their ability 
to act on the right kind of motivations. Separation ends the subjective commitment that underlies 
imperfect duties in intimate relationships. This distinction explains, in part, differential treatment 
of intimate duties. Some duties, such as the duties of care and fidelity, involve such extensive 
latitude that the motivation plays a decisive role in identifying sufficient performance. Whether 
an outside attachment is inconsistent with marital fidelity is a highly contextual judgment, admit-
ting of few if any general rules. One can say little more than spouses should avoid emotional en-
tanglements that interfere with their commitment to one another, unless the parties expressly de-
fine their required conduct. For duties like this, terminating the relationship ends the duty. Other 
intimate duties, however, are less inextricably tied to the motivation for the required conduct. 
The duty of financial support permits less latitude than the duty of fidelity, so its boundaries are 
less dependent on the underlying motivations. 
Separation removes the two principled obstacles to legal protections for imperfect marital 
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rights. The practical problem of vagueness remains. However, we saw four potential responses to 
vague rights: reasonableness tests, procedural tests, low standards of review and enforcing only 
explicit agreements. Separation does not remove the potential unfairness of the fourth method, 
but it does alleviate the problems with the other three. Reasonableness tests and procedural tests 
are problematic during the relationship because they replace the parties’ discretion with that of a 
judge or jury. In post-separation litigation, however, there is no alternative to substituting some 
third party’s judgment for the parties’ discretion. Separation also removes the tension between 
trying to enforce only fundamental failures (non-vague instances) while maintaining the relation-
ship. After the separation, of course, this conceptual tension no longer exists.  
2. What dissolution norms are appropriate 
If separation marks a categorical divide because it ends the couple’s discretion and commit-
ment, what implications does this have for the appropriate remedies? The dominant scheme of 
divorce law in America is equitable division with egalitarian presumptions. Judges have discre-
tion to divide property “equitably,” with a thumb on the scale for equal divisions and with the 
ability to offset unfairness with ad hoc property adjustments and alimony awards.
231
 The ra-
tionale for the intact marriage rule supports – in broad strokes – this core structure of the divorce 
law. Equitable distribution rules give judges flexibility to give effect to spouses marital duties, 
when they are discernible, while egalitarian presumptions recognize that from the state’s per-
spective, spouses enter and exit marriage as equal citizens. These two aspects of modern divorce 
law are a coherent response given the state’s lack of enforcement during the relationship. 
Equitable distribution schemes give judges authority to interpret the couple’s relationship.232 
As we saw in Parts II and III, this is an unavoidable feature of legal protection. The state defers 
protection during the relationship so couples can define the imperfect marital duties, but in the 
divorce context, neither spouse’s disputed understanding of their relationship can be controlling. 
Equitable distribution rules entrust judges to look at the relationship as a whole and determine 
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each spouses’ intimate duties. Typical statutes list eight to ten relevant factors, including various 
dimensions of need, the parties’ contributions, and their marital standard of living. The statutes 
rarely explain, however, what weight judges should give to each factor or how they interact. 
They encourage judges to view the couple’s relationship as a whole, rather than isolate specific 
transactions. In short, equitable discretion gives courts wide discretion to try to discern how the 
parties’ have allocated their respective imperfect obligations, both now and in the future.233 
Despite equitable discretion, the tendency is toward equal divisions.
234
 What justifies using 
egalitarian default rules? One cynical answer is simply that equal division is easier, but I think 
there is a deeper reason. The answer lies in the spouses’ transformation from legal strangers to a 
married couple and back. From the state’s perspective, spouses are first and foremost citizens. It 
can justifiably assume that its citizens enter, maintain and leave marriage as equals. During mar-
riage, the state suspends the ordinary private law rules that ensure formal equality between citi-
zens, so that spouses can commit to a comprehensive relationship characterized by imperfect du-
ties. At divorce, when spouses seek to resume their status as legal strangers, the state should not 
let one spouse unfairly benefit from the decision to suspend the ordinary rules. Accordingly, the 
state’s egalitarian default rules need not be justified as a way to encourage an egalitarian or a 
partnership conception of marriage (of course, such rationales causally factored in these deci-
sions).
 235
 Rather, egalitarian default rules can be justified as a fair way to disentangle lives inter-
twined through unenforceable obligations.  
Another way to see the appropriateness of an equitable regime with egalitarian defaults is to 
imagine the alternatives. Formulated as ideal ends of a spectrum, the law’s alternatives are (a) to 
enforce the precise norms of the couple’s relationship or (b) to impose the state’s view of appro-
priate relationship norms. Why not enforce, as best one can, the terms of their actual marriage? 
Because doing so would be inconsistent with the legal status of their relationship. The absence of 
enforcement during marriage enables spouses to regulate their relationship through imperfect 
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duties that resist enforcement through private law. It would be incongruous for the state then to 
strive to identify and enforce the latest terms of a couple’s relationship, as if they were ordinary 
private litigants after all. On the other end of the spectrum, the state might simply impose on di-
vorcing couples its preferred conception of appropriate long-term relationships. That vision 
might be a liberal egalitarian community, or a partnership model of marriage as a labor-division 
tool or a traditional model of marriage as a lifelong bargain for mutual support. Yet, insofar as 
the state is willing to impose its normative vision at divorce, however, it is less clear why the 
state should be willing to forbear during the relationship. Instead, equitable distribution schemes 
permit the law to enforce intimate duties insofar as they are discernable, filling in the large gaps 
using egalitarian default rules based on a presumption of equal citizenship.  
* * * * 
Relationships involve claim rights, but rights that correlate with imperfect duties that leave 
intimates significant discretion regarding the manner, time and occasions for performance. By 
exercising that discretion, intimates define their vision of the relationship and demonstrate their 
commitment to it. Legal enforcement of ongoing intimate duties conflicts with maintaining the 
relationship, replacing the intimates’ discretion with the court’s judgment and their commitment 
with sanctions. This conflict supplies a legitimate reason–albeit not a definitive one–for a state to 
defer enforcement of intimate rights during ongoing relationships. Deferring enforcement ena-
bles intimates’ to maintain a relationship characterized by imperfect duties, leaving them space 
to define their relationship. Once the couple separates, these reasons lose most of their force. The 
state’s dissolution norms can be guided by the same reasons it defers rights. The egalitarian de-
faults express the state’s view that neither party should take unfair advantage of the period of de-
ferred legal protections, while the equitable discretion allows judges to tailor these egalitarian 
default norms to the parties’ relationship.  
While I cannot offer a full defense of the intact marriage rule, I want to forestall two common 
objections. The first rests on what I regard as a misunderstanding, so I address it quickly. The 
second requires more attention.  
First, aspects of my argument sound similar to the ideology of marital privacy used to ration-
alize legal rules that oppress women. While my argument has some resemblance to historical 
marital privacy doctrines, it is conceptually and normatively distinct. Nothing I have said as-
sumes, as traditionalists claim, that marriage has necessary or natural norms or that marriage’s 
norms are or should be immune from legal influence. While I have argued that marital status cre-
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ates leeway for spouses to define their marriage, I have taken pains to emphasize that marriage is 
not a “law-free space.” This space is sustained by the political decision not to subject intimate 
rights to ordinary private law. Moreover, my argument that the state should refrain from enforc-
ing marital rights does not apply to rights that spouses have against all citizens, such as a right of 
bodily integrity.  
That said, I have argued that marriage laws reflect a typical feature of intimate relationships: 
namely, that they involve imperfect duties. I offered no theory to explain why intimate norms are 
often imperfect duties; instead, I drew this assumption from a survey of typical intimate norms. 
My intuitions on this score might be wrong. Perhaps many people structure their intimate rela-
tionships using perfect duties. For those relationships, my argument for the intact marriage rule 
and equitable divorce do not apply. So it goes with assumptions. In a similar vein, one might ob-
ject that this assumption simply postpones the deeper question of whether intimate relationships 
defined by imperfect duties are valuable. We could reduce our factual, moral and legal vulnera-
bility by entering less comprehensive relationships with more determinate content.
236
 On the oth-
er hand, we might lose valuable forms of life. This debate about the value of intimate relation-
ships is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article assumes only that individuals currently en-
ter intimate relationships characterized by pervasively imperfect obligations, and their obliga-
tions affect their existing legal rights.  
Second, one might argue that the intact marriage rule creates unfair marital incentives that re-
inforce gender inequality. I have encountered two versions of this argument. The first, more gen-
eral objection is that the intact marriage rule places an unfair burden on the injured spouse. The 
victim, usually cast as a wife, must choose between relinquishing her marital rights to retain the 
marriage and vindicating her marital rights by abandoning it. In contrast, the offending husband 
may continue violating his wife’s marital rights and maintain the benefits of marriage.237 Despite 
its initial plausibility, the force of this argument relies on an incomplete picture of spouses’ in-
centives. Whether it is fair to deny disaffected spouses legal enforcement cannot be evaluated 
entirely from an entirely ex post perspective.  
Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott have offered a persuasive response to this objection.
238
 Le-
gal and non-legal incentives can be substitutes, and a rational choice between them depends on 
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an ex ante assessment of their relative efficiency to encourage cooperative marital behavior. 
Spouses have three extra-legal mechanisms to incentivize cooperation: internalized norms, self-
help and social sanctions.
239
 Spouses internalize moral norms about caring, promising and fair-
ness, so that guilt and shame provide incentives for cooperative marital behavior.
240
 Spouses 
supplement these “internal” motivations with self-help means to reward cooperation and punish 
defection. Assuming rational actors, a pattern of reciprocal cooperation between spouses should 
lead to equilibrium at a set of “highly contextualized and precise” rules to distribute benefits and 
burdens of marriage to maximize the couple’s cooperative surplus.241 Last, because moral mo-
tives and cooperative incentives cannot override all temptations, spouses rely on social enforce-
ment.
 242
 Friends, extended family, coworkers and churches encourage cooperation and censure 
inappropriate behavior. Signaling tools like engagements, weddings and rings encourage social 
recognition, monitoring and enforcement.
243
 In some cases, couples may use pastors or psy-
chologists for informal adjudication through counseling and mediation.
244
 
Whether couples should also want enforceable rights during marriage depends on whether 
such “formal sanctions would provide an efficient substitute for, or a complement to, informal 
normative sanctions.”245 Scott and Scott argue that because a couples’ cooperative equilibrium 
depends on their own highly specific pattern of cooperation, defection and retaliation, a third par-
ty is unlikely to adjudicate their disputes accurately or efficiently. Moreover, “legal adjudication 
is structured as a single iteration zero-sum game,” which leads parties to adopt an adversarial 
posture in conflicts with the “harmony, reciprocity and solidarity” needed for cooperative rela-
tionships.
246
 They conclude that a rational couple would choose not to permit “intramarital” legal 
enforcement because it would provide few additional incentives to cooperation.  
This more complete story responds to the general objection, but opens the door to a more tar-
geted feminist criticism. Mary Anne Case has argued that the lack of legal enforcement fosters a 
gendered division of labor.
247
 Gendered relationships remain the social norm, so couples with 
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egalitarian relationships have weaker moral and social incentives. A husband who fails to live up 
to his equal bargain will feel guilty for breaking his promise and shameful for failing to fulfill his 
ideal, but he can assuage his conscience with the thought that he did more than most men. More-
over, the community is unlikely to reinforce his guilt. Social authorities such as pastors, counse-
lors, family and friends are more likely to substitute typical gendered norms for the couple’s un-
conventional egalitarian expectations. This is likely as a statistical matter and likely because men 
have an incentive to preserve gendered norms. Judges, in contrast, are more likely to enforce 
egalitarian relationships. Unlike pastors or counselors, judges have internalized legal norms that 
demand enforcement of agreements and non-discrimination. Moreover, appellate review can re-
inforce conformity to these ideals. Permitting legal enforcement of marital rights during mar-
riage, Case argues, would help empower spouses who want to adopt egalitarian relationships.  
Enforcement of intramarital bargains, however, would be a double-edged sword. While cur-
rent law does not enforce egalitarian agreements during marriage, it does impose default rules at 
divorce that tend towards equal treatment. Divorce law does not formally discriminate, and its 
rules can be reformed to support more substantive equality without sacrificing formal equality or 
autonomy. For instance, divorce law could help alleviate the gendered division of labor by 
providing greater protection for caretaking spouses’ reliance interests.248 As I argued above, di-
vorce law has legitimate reasons to follow egalitarian defaults irrespective of the couple’s rela-
tionship. In contrast, spouses could enforce ongoing marital obligations, family law must face a 
stark choice between equality and autonomy. Many couples live in traditional, gendered relation-
ships, likely more than egalitarian ones.
249
 If the law enforces marital rights during the relation-
ship, it would either lend state coercion to enforce unequal marital arrangements or bluntly im-
pose egalitarian default rules contrary to the couple’s understanding. This choice is another in-
stance of the tradeoff repeated throughout this Article. To enforce intimate rights, the state must 
interpose its vision of the couple’s obligations. The pairing of deferred rights with equitable rem-
edies provides a way to manage this tension between citizens’ right to define their intimate obli-
gations and intimates’ right to equality as citizens.  
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The state cannot abolish marriage, in the sense of abolishing status-based norms. Private law 
tailors our legal rights to the nature of our relationships. If a state abolished status licenses, pri-
vate law would either develop intimacy categories or create a systemic exception for “intimate 
relationships.” Tort, contract and equity incorporate status distinctions because intimacy carries 
special duties, duties that presumptively affect legal rights. However, the incorporation of inti-
macy into private law presents a recurring problem: how can officials enforce contextual and in-
determinate intimate rights without imposing social and moral judgment on intimate parties?  
A closer look at intimate duties explains both why legal enforcement vacillates and why it 
cannot ultimately avoid status norms. Many intimate norms are imperfect duties that leave inti-
mates wide discretion to decide how and when to fulfill them. This plays havoc with legal en-
forcement, especially during a relationship, because officials must supplant the intimates’ discre-
tion to specify their intimate duties and their commitment to the relationship. The only way for 
legal officials to specify a couple’s imperfect duties is by categorizing their relationship and im-
posing moral or social norms.  
Marital status offers a reasonable resolution of this dilemma. By deferring intimate rights un-
til the relationship ends, the state avoids displacing couples’ discretion and imposing on their 
commitment. If they separate, they abandon this commitment and lose this discretion, so the state 
can step back in and give officials discretion to protect imperfect intimate rights. The state can 
legitimately use egalitarian default rules to protect marital rights, not because egalitarian rules 
envision a particular theory of a good marriage, but because egalitarian rules are an appropriate 
way to ensure the equality of citizens when the state permits them to defer the legal protection of 
their rights. Marriage–or some status with marriage’s tripartite structure–allows couples to adopt 
relationships of imperfect legal duties.  
